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FOREWORD 
Economic preferences of individuals play a significant role in almost every important economic 
decision. For instance, whenever costs and benefits for an individual or household are 
uncertain, it is essential to calculate the present value certainty equivalents in order to undertake 
meaningful comparisons. The extent to which people are willing to take risk constitutes their 
risk and time preferences. In effect, assessing and measuring the economic preferences of 
individuals is critical for economic analysis and policy prescriptions (Charness et al., 2013). 
For example, risk preference is identified as one of the main drivers of farm management and 
land use decisions (Chavas et al., 2010; Jianjun et al., 2015). Also, the risk preference of 
farmers is identified as a major player in agricultural production decision (Feder, 1980; Just 
and Zilberman, 1983; Adger et al., 2009). In addition to risk preferences, socio-cognitive 
processes of decision makers are also suggested to be important for motivating adaptation 
decision (Jordan and McDaniels, 2013; Jianjun et al., 2015).  
Agriculture, which plays a major role in the livelihoods of households in the sub-Saharan 
Africa and serves as a stimulus for economic growth, providing food security and assisting in 
poverty reduction, is identified to be susceptible to risks and uncertainty (Cervantes-Godoy et 
al., 2013; Ellis, 2017). These risks and uncertainty may come from a wide range of factors 
including vagaries of weather, the unpredictable nature of biophysical processes, the 
pronounced seasonality of production and market cycles, the geographical separation of 
production and end uses, and the unique and uncertain political economy of food and 
agriculture sectors, both domestic and international (Jaffee et al., 2010). These shocks are 
mainly faced by rural households and these increase their vulnerability to both transient and 
chronic poverty. 
Climate shock is ranked among the most pervasive stresses that face rural households 
(Ziervogel and Calder, 2003) especially in developing countries where rural livelihoods are 
inextricably linked to the natural environment1 (Mensah and Adu, 2015). In addition, Barrett 
et al. (2007) argues that, weather risks and climate shocks are critically important constraints 
to wealth accumulation, particularly for those in rural areas who are either engaged in 
agricultural activities or have their livelihoods tied to the well-being of the farming sector. This 
is because, when climate shocks strike, its immediate impacts among other things are 
																																																						
1 Many rural households depend on rain-fed agriculture, and the forest for their livelihood. 
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destruction of crops, damage to property, loss of savings and assets and threats to health and 
nutrition. These short-term costs of climate shocks according to the United Nations 
Development Programme (2008), can have devastating and highly visible consequences for 
human development. 
Adaptation and mitigation are considered the most important policy options in reducing the 
impact of climate shock (IPCC, 2014). However, because of the frustration over the lack of 
process and effectiveness of policy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a surge in interest in 
impact oriented action is discernible since the beginning of the century, in contrast to efforts 
centred on prevention (Burton et al, 2002). Thus, there has been a shift from mitigation towards 
adaptation over the years. In effect, adapting to climate change has consequently emerged as a 
solution to address the impacts of climate shocks and these are already evident in some regions. 
Adaptation seeks to lower the risks posed by the consequences of climate shocks and it involves 
changes in agricultural management practices in response to changes in climate conditions. It 
often involves a combination of various individual responses at the farm-level and assumes 
that farmers have access to alternative practices and technologies available in the region. 
However, most adaptation strategies are characterised by risk and uncertainty. Thus, the issue 
of better characterizing risk and time preferences may be particularly important as adaptation 
programs are meant to introduce new products to farmers. However, before institute policies 
are instituted to reduce the impact of climate shocks on income from production and how 
effectiveness these strategies will be, it is important to first estimate the impact of climate 
shocks on income from crop production in Ghana. This is what I did in the first paper of this 
thesis. 
An econometric model to estimate a stochastic production function that quantifies the effects 
of climate variables (average temperature and precipitation) and other inputs (area cultivated, 
trend and agricultural labour force) on the mean, variance and skewness of real per capita 
income from crops was adopted. One major finding was the effect of precipitation and variation 
in precipitation on real per capita income from crops. The results show that, even though, both 
variables do not have significant effect on per capita income from crop production, they both 
contribute to increasing downside risk exposure. In other words, annual precipitation and 
variation in precipitation increases the probability of crop failure, thereby, reducing per capita 
income from crop production. 
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After confirming the fact that precipitation and variation in precipitation significantly increases 
the probability of crop failure, I focussed on investigating how different degree of exposure to 
flood, which is caused by variability in precipitation, impact on the behavioural traits of farmers 
and their decision-making process in adopting adaptation strategies, which is considered as one 
of the most important policy options in reducing the impact of climate shocks (IPCC, 2014). 
In particular, I exploit a natural experiment implied by different degree of exposure to risk in 
terms of flood and the effects these risks have on the behavioural traits of farmers, and their 
willingness to adopt adaptation strategies. 
Contrary to standard economic hypothesis that individuals' preferences are fixed, the results 
show that preferences are not stable, with exposure to risks making people more risk averse, 
impatient and more cooperative. The results also show that exposure to different degree of risk 
has a significant effect on adaptation strategies, but the main channel through which it impacts 
respondents’ adaptation decisions is through risk aversion. In particular, being exposed to high 
degree of risk makes respondents less likely to access credit to invest in their farms, more 
willing to pay higher agricultural insurance premium and more willing to contribute higher 
amount for the construction of drainage systems to reduce the impact of flood on their farms 
and households. In effect, by reducing the exposure to risk, policy makers can obtain less risk 
averse households and thereby making it easier to implement adaptation strategies. 
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Abstract 
Risk and uncertainty are ubiquitous and varied within the agricultural sector coming from a 
wide range of factors including vagaries of weather, the unpredictable nature of biophysical 
processes, market cycles and enabling environment. This study was used to investigate how 
weather risk and climate shocks and other agricultural inputs impact real per capita income 
from food crop production in Ghana. An econometric model to estimate a stochastic production 
function that quantifies the effects of these variables on the mean, variance and skewness of 
real per capita income was adopted. The results show that average temperature has a 
significant concave relationship on real per capita income, indicating that rising average 
temperature increases real per capita income but the increase in real per capita income 
diminishes as average temperature increases above a maximum 27.78°C. Precipitation on the 
other hand does not have any significant effect on real per capita income on the average. It 
was, however, found to have a risk decreasing effect on the variability in real per capita income 
but increases the probability of crop failure resulting in low real per capita income. It was also 
revealed that, whereas variability in average temperature was found to reduce the probability 
of crop failure, variability in annual total precipitation was found to increase the probability 
of crop failure and thus reduces real per capita income. Future research will focus on how 
different degree of exposure to the risk flood impact on the behavioral traits of farmers and 
their decision-making process in adopting adaptation strategies.
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1. Introduction 
Risk and uncertainty are ubiquitous and varied within the agricultural sector in both developed and 
developing countries, and even though the sources and consequences may differ between countries 
they are generally experienced by most farmers in most countries. These risks and uncertainty may 
come from a wide range of factors including vagaries of weather, the unpredictable nature of 
biophysical processes, the pronounced seasonality of production and market cycles, the 
geographical separation of production and end uses, and the unique and uncertain political 
economy of food and agriculture sectors, both domestic and international (Jaffee et al., 2010).  
Agriculture plays a dominant role in the livelihoods of households in the sub-Saharan Africa, 
serving as a stimulus for economic growth, providing food security and assisting in poverty 
reduction. However, poverty and food insecurity are critical issues for most countries in sub-
Saharan Africa with one of the major cause of these problems attributed to agriculture’s 
susceptibility to production, price and policy risks which impact farmers’ income and welfare 
(Cervantes-Godoy et al., 2013; Ellis, 2017). Even though there has been a decline in agricultural 
sector’s performance and its contribution to most socioeconomic indicators, the sector still plays 
a central role in the Ghanaian economy. For instance, the sector still absorbs the highest proportion 
of the Ghanaian total employed population, with about 36% of the labour force employed in 
agricultural sector. It is worth noting that about 84% of the agricultural labour force are in the rural 
areas (GSS, 2016). 
Crop production in Ghana is risky as it is mainly rain-fed and prone to a number of shocks 
including: climatic shocks, pest and diseases, bushfires and price shocks (Choudhary et al., 2015). 
These types of shocks affect different types of crops and can result in the reduction of the national 
value of production. For instance, the national maize yield has decreased by an average of 2.5% 
every year for the past half-decade (MOFA, 2016). Production risk, which include weather risks 
and climate shocks, bushfires and pest and diseases, is ranked among the most pervasive stresses 
that face farmers (Choudhary et al., 2015) especially in developing countries where rural 
livelihoods are inextricably linked to the natural environment2 (Mensah and Adu, 2015). 
																																																						
2 Many rural households depend on rain-fed agriculture, and the forest for their livelihood. 
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According to Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), while several factors contribute to household 
income variability, rainfall variability is likely to influence welfare the most, particularly because 
it is spatially covariant. Barrett et al. (2007) also argues that, weather risks and climate shocks are 
critically important constraints to wealth accumulation, particularly for those in rural areas who 
are either engaged in agricultural activities or have their livelihoods tied to the well-being of the 
farming sector. This is because, when climate shocks strike, its immediate impacts among other 
things are destruction of crops, damage to property, loss of savings and assets and threats to health 
and nutrition. These short-term costs of climate shocks according to the United Nations 
Development Programme (2008), can have devastating and highly visible consequences for human 
development. 
In effect, before we institute policies to whether adapt or mitigate the effects of climate shocks on 
income from crop production and the effectiveness of policies to reduce these impacts, it is 
important to first estimate the impact of climate shocks on income from crop production in Ghana. 
Even though in the long run the extent to which the degree of sensitivity of crop production 
depends on technological change, crop climate adaptation (adoption of high yielding varieties, 
improved planting and management practices, the use of fertilizer and pesticides etc.) and CO2 
fertilization, examining historical data and relating production variability to climate can identify 
how agricultural productivity is sensitive to climate change. This paper will thus examine and 
understand how weather risk and climate shocks impact real per capita income from agriculture in 
the country.  
2. Literature Review 
Since the late 1970’s, the literature addressing climate change impacts has made conscious effort 
to shift from literature based on “expert opinion” surveys on the impacts of climate change on 
agriculture to dynamic multi-region, multi-sector economic models. Among the first efforts to 
assess the agricultural impacts of climate change was undertaken by National Defense University 
(NDU) in 1978 (Darwin et al., 1995). The study assembled an international group of climate 
experts and elicited their opinions concerning the probabilities of various climate change events 
and the resulting impacts on agriculture. The notable finding of the study was experts disagreeing 
on most matters related to climate change (Darwin et al., 1995). Many efforts have since then been 
made to measure the economic impact of climate change on agriculture, initially focusing mainly 
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on the United States and other developed countries (Adams, 1989; Mendelsohn et al., 1994; Bruce 
et al., 1996; Reilly et al., 1999). However, little research was focused specifically on the 
developing countries even though some experts (Fankhauser, 1995; Pearce et al., 1996) have 
extrapolated their results of findings worldwide. In recent times, while some studies have been 
conducted to assess the impact of climate change on agriculture in developing countries (Dinar et 
al., 2008; Kumar and Parikh, 1998; Mendelson et al, 2000; Deressa et al., 2005; Kurukulasuriya, 
2006; Seo and Mendelsohn, 2006; Maddison et al., 2007; Molua and Lambi, 2007; Seo and 
Mendelsohn, 2008a, Seo et al., 2009; Deressa and Hassan, 2009), very little research has been 
carried in Ghana to study climate change impacts on agriculture. 
Various models have been used to assess the impact of climate change on agriculture. Each of 
these models has various advantages and disadvantages and they also present different levels of 
complexity and completeness in relation to the specific aspects that are considered in their analysis. 
The two main methods that have been used include: the structural modelling method which, relies 
on empirical or experimental production functions to predict environmental change (Mendelsohn 
et al., 1994) and the spatial analogue models, which uses econometric approaches and economic 
data on the value of land to analyse the impact of climate on agriculture across different climate 
zones. Other impact assessment methods that have been used are the integrated impact assessment 
method and the agro-ecological zone (AEZ) method (Mendelsohn, 2000). 
Three major components under the structural modelling method include: Physiological studies, 
crop simulation models, and economic models. Physiological research addresses how changes in 
weather (e.g. temperature and precipitation) and other factors affect crops. Crop modeling studies, 
on the other hand, simulates how yields change under different conditions, whether using historical 
data or future projections and economic studies examine how yields change when market 
interactions are considered and how this affects prices, production, consumption, and trade. Each 
component of the research is influenced by other factors such as climate stress (precipitation, 
temperature, availability of water, among others) based on General Circulation Model (GCM) 
results and may include information on specific technologies, such as drought and heat tolerance 
(Islam et al., 2016). 
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Crop simulation models can be divided into two types, which rely on a large set of projected 
climate change effects from various GCMs that take into account temperature, precipitation, water 
stresses, and other variables, include: crop simulation models that are process-based and statistical 
models that are reduced form. Process-based models specify agents and their behaviour in dynamic 
systems to estimate the effects of counterfactual changes (Islam et al., 2016; Chetty, 2009; Sims, 
1986). The reduced form models, on the other hand, describe relationships among selected 
variables while holding others constant and estimate statistical relationships. In addition, the 
reduced form statistical analyses use historical and field trial data to estimate relationships between 
yield and climate variables which are then used to project yields into the future under various 
GCMs (Islam et al., 2016). The production function approach, which is based on experimental or 
empirical analysis of the relationships between yield and environmental factors (Chang, 2002), is 
an example of the reduced form model. 
In all, the basic idea of these approaches is that agricultural production growth depends on soil-
related climatic variables and socio-economic variables that are implemented as explanatory 
variables in the model for estimating the production function (Chang, 1977; Randall, 2001; 
Fleischer et al., 2008). Therefore, under these approaches, yield sensitivity to climate change is 
estimated by assessing the empirical production function that links water, soil, climate and 
economic input to yields for specific crops. This is because climate variables play an important 
role in determining crop yields or production since climatic factors are related to important stages 
in plant phenology. For example, precipitation with germination and flowering; and temperature 
with development and maturation of the fruit. Plant development also depends on their exposure 
to moisture and temperature during their growing stage.  
The spatial analogue approach, which uses cross-sectional evidence to undertake statistical 
(econometric) estimations of how changes in climate would affect agricultural production across 
different climatic zones, include: The Future Agricultural Resources Model (FARM) by Darwin 
et al. (1994, 1995); and the Ricardian approach by Mendelsohn et al. (1994). The basic underlying 
assumption for these models is that similar climates mean similar production practices. This 
assumption allows the models to implicitly capture changes in production inputs, crop or livestock 
outputs or management practices that farmers are likely to adopt in response to changing climatic 
and other conditions (Darwin, 1999).  
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Early research on the impact of a changing climate focused mainly on the different effects of 
climate change on crop production using crop simulation models. In one of the earliest studies, 
Newman (1980) under this model concluded that the United States Corn Belt would shift northeast 
for every 1˚C rise in temperature. Another crop simulation study by Blasing and Solomon (1984) 
concluded that the United States Corn Belt would contract particularly in its southwest region, 
under warmer and drier growing seasons. In a similar analysis, a study by Rosenzweig (1985) 
revealed that climate change would increase winter wheat production in Canada, while the major 
effect in the United States would be regional shifts in the use of wheat cultivars. A series of case 
studies by Parry et al. (1988) also concluded by not taking into account CO2 effects or adaptation 
that warmer temperature in high-latitude countries will by the lengthening of the growing season 
increase crop production. However, the study revealed that higher evapotranspiration will lead to 
adverse effects on crop yields.  
Warrick (1984) also used a regression to simulate temperature increases similar to those that 
occurred in the 1930’s in the United States and found that crop production decreased. Another 
study by Terjung et al. (1984), who employed the production function approach to estimate the 
impact of climate change and deduced that the amounts of water for irrigation would have to be 
greater when faced with rising temperatures if no technological changes were made. In a study by 
Easterling et al., (1993) in the United States using the production function approach, it was 
revealed that in the absence of technological changes or increases in CO2, climate change would 
bring about reductions in production resulting in economic losses. 
Early studies on the impact of climate change on agriculture from developing countries also 
predominantly relied on structural modeling approaches with limited adaptation. For example, 
Seshu and Cady (1984) estimated a decrease in rice yield in India at the rate of 0.71 tonnes per 
hectare given an increase in minimum temperature from 18˚C to 19˚C. The study also shows that 
an increase in minimum temperature from 22˚C to 23˚C will result in a decrease in rice yield in 
India at a rate of 0.41 tonnes per hectare. In a similar analysis, Sinha and Swaminathan (1991) 
found that an increase in mean air temperature by 2˚C could reduce rice by about 0.75 tonnes per 
hectare in the high-yield areas and by 0.06 tonnes per hectare in the low-yield coastal areas. The 
study also revealed that a 0.5˚C increase in winter temperature would reduce wheat crop duration 
by seven days and decrease yield by 0.45 tonnes per hectare. In addition, the increase in winter 
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temperature is estimated to account for a 10 percent reduction in wheat production in high-yield 
areas. In another crop simulation study, Aggarawal and Sinha (1993) show that a 1˚C rise in mean 
temperature in North India would have no significant effects on wheat yields. They, however, 
concluded that a 2˚C increase in mean temperature would reduce yields in most places.  
The main weakness of the structural modeling approach was that it endorses the so-called “dumb-
farmer” hypothesis, which excludes from it analysis farmer’s behaviour and farmer’s management 
practices, which includes the plausible adoption by farmers of strategies for coping with the effects 
of climate change. In other to overcome this limitation, Mendelsohn et al. (1994) proposed the 
Ricardian model which estimates the relationship between the outcomes of farms and climate 
normal using and including, among regressors, the appropriate control variables (De Salvo et al., 
2013). In effect, it considers farmer’s management strategies implicitly without the need to 
implement such strategies as explanatory variables (Mendelsohn and Dinar, 2009).  
In view of this critique about excluding from it analysis farmer’s behaviour and farmer’s 
management practices, some structural modeling approaches in the literature successfully 
introduced adaptation into crop simulation models (Jin et al., 1994; El-Shaer et al., 1997; 
Kapetanaki and Rosenzweig, 1997; Iglesias and Minguez, 1997). These farm level studies begin 
with agronomic models but then examine efficient responses by farmers to climate change using 
an economic model of the farm. In other words, adaptation is addressed by simulating changes in 
the growth parameters of various crops according to the latest scientific advances. However, these 
models fail to account for economic considerations and limitations in human capital and other 
resources that affect actual farm-level decisions (Mendelsohn, 2000) which makes it difficult to 
interpret the adaptation scenarios frequently explored. This is because farmers are likely to respond 
to changing climate and other environmental factors by varying, among other things, the crop mix, 
planting and harvesting dates, irrigation scheduling and application of fertilizers and pesticides to 
mitigate the potential harmful effects of climate change. 
The production function approach, which is the model used in this study, generally link the outputs 
of crops or livestock as functions of inputs to the production process, such as land, labour, capital 
and entrepreneurial skill. These inputs can be incorporated individually, or as an index, such as the 
Laspeyres Quantity Index, which can combine any physical inputs together. The basic idea of this 
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approach is that agricultural production growth depends on soil-related and climatic variables that 
are implemented as explanatory variables in the model for estimating the production function 
(Chang, 1977; Randall, 2000). Therefore, under this approach, yield sensitivity to climate change 
is estimated by assessing the empirical production function that links water, soil, climate and 
economic input to yields for specific crops. The effect of climate change is assessed by considering 
the yield variations comparing two alternative scenarios using general circulation model (De 
Salvio et al., 2013). 
While the production function approach is the least common approach used to model the impacts 
of climate change on agricultural outputs to date, it is empirically sound. One advantage of this 
approach is that it provides estimates for climate change effect on crop yields that do not include 
bias due to agricultural output factors such as soil quality that are beyond the control of the farmer 
(Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007). A further advantage of the production function approach is 
that it takes into consideration historical farm level and aggregated data and thus able to account 
for farmer’s historical reactions to changes in climatic and economic conditions. 
It has also been adopted to account for the impact of climate change on the agricultural sector in 
developed countries (Warrick, 1984; Terjung et al., 1984; Easterling et al., 1993; Deschenes and 
Greenstone, 2007) and developing countries (Turpie et al., 2002; Isik and Devadoss, 2006; Poudel 
and Kotani, 2013). Even though several studies have used the production function approach and 
the stochastic production function approach to measure the impact of climate change on agriculture 
and the risk of the changing climate on crop yield (Chang, 2002; Schlenker et al., 2006; Isak and 
Devadoss, 2006; Deschênes and Greenstone, 2007), higher moments of the stochastic production 
function has not been considered explicitly. We, therefore, argue that the higher moments of the 
stochastic production function should be exploited to estimate the risk of the changing climate on 
crop yield. The Just and Pope stochastic production function will thus be adopted to measure the 
impact of climate change on mean crop productivity and higher order variations of crop yield 
(Antle, 1983) in Ghana. 
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3. Data 
3.1 Agriculture in Ghana 
Ghana lies within latitude 4˚44’N and 11˚11’N and 3˚11’W and 1˚11’E longitude covering 
approximately 238,500 km2. It is located on the south coast of West Africa and bordered in the 
west by Cote d’Ivoire, to the east by Togo, to the north by Burkina Faso and to the south by the 
Gulf of Guinea. Administratively, the country is divided into 10 regions and 170 districts. The 
overall topography is low and gently undulating with most slopes of less than 5 percent and many 
not exceeding 1 percent. Despite the gentle slopes, approximately 70% of the land is susceptible 
to significant erosion (MOFA, 2013). The country is composed of six agro-ecological zones, which 
are distinguished by natural vegetation and influenced by climate and soil characteristics (see 
Figure 1).  
                                            
                                      Fig. 1: Map of Ghana showing agro-ecological zones.  
                                      Source: Kemausuor et al. (2013). 
Variation in precipitation and temperature are controlled by the movement and interaction of 
continental and maritime winds. The evergreen rain forest, deciduous rain forest, transition and 
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coastal savannah zones make up the southern half of the country. These agro-ecological zones 
have a bimodal equatorial rainfall pattern, allowing for two growing seasons (major and minor 
growing seasons) (see Table 1). The greater part of the three northern regions is covered by the 
Guinea savannah, but part of the Upper East region is covered by the Sudan savannah. These agro-
ecological zones (Sudan and Guinea Savannah) benefit from a single tropical monsoon, allowing 
for only one major growing season (see Table1) (Hielm and Dasori, 2012). This single growing 
season is bound by the harmattan period, which begins in December and ends in March.  
Table 1: Precipitation and growing seasons in Ghana by agro-ecological zone 
Agroecological 
Zone 
Area 
(km2) 
Mean 
Annual 
Prec. 
Annual 
Prec. 
Range 
Major 
Rainy 
Season 
Minor 
Rainy 
Season 
Growing Period 
(days) 
      Major 
Season 
Minor 
Season 
Rain Forest 9500 2200 800-2800 Mar-July Sept-Nov 150-160 100 
Deciduous 
Forest 
66000 1500 1200-1600 Mar-July Sept-Nov 150-160 90 
Transition 
Zone 
8400 1300 1100-1400 Mar-July Sept-Nov 200-220 60 
Coastal 
Savannah 
4500 800 600-1200 Mar-July Sept-Nov 110-110 60 
Guinea 
Savannah 
147900 1000 800-1200 May-Sept  180-200  
Sudan 
Savannah 
2200 1000 800-1000 May-Sept  150-160  
Source: FAO, 2005 and MOFA, 2013. 
A total of 136,000 km2 representing approximately 56.9 percent of Ghana’s total land area is 
classified as agricultural land (MOFA, 2016). Of the total agricultural land, approximately 47.2 
percent is under cultivation, and only about 3.4 percent of the cultivated area is irrigated. The 
major crops cultivated in Ghana include numerous cereals, root and tuber, fruit, legumes, vegetable 
and industrial crops (FAO, 2005). The staple crops include cereals (maize and rice), roots and 
tubers (yam and cassava) and legumes (groundnuts and cowpea). Vegetables (tomatoes and 
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pepper) and fruits (orange, avocado and mango) provide essential micronutrients. In 2015, the total 
land area used to cultivate annual crops, which include cereals, tubers, legumes and vegetables 
was approximately 12000km2 (MOFA, 2016). The industrial crops, which are cash crops for 
export revenue, include cocoa and oil palm. Smallholder rain-fed farming using rudimentary 
technologies dominates the agricultural sector accounting for 80% of total agricultural production 
and approximately 90% of smallholder farms are less than two hectares in size, and produce a 
diversity of crops. Larger farms and plantations primarily cultivate cocoa, oil-palm, rubber and 
coconut, and to a lesser extent, cereals and pineapples (MOFA, 2013). 
Table 2: Principal crops grown in agro-ecological zones 
Agroecological 
Zone 
Cereals Starchy crops Legumes Vegetables Tree crops 
High Rain 
Forest 
Maize, rice Cassava, 
cocoyam, 
plantain 
 Pepper, okra, 
eggplant 
Citrus, coconut, 
oil palm, rubber 
Deciduous 
Rain Forest 
Maize, rice Cassava, 
cocoyam, 
plantain 
Cowpea Pepper, okra, 
eggplant, 
tomato 
Citrus, coconut, 
coffee, cocoa 
Transition 
Zone 
Maize, 
rice, 
sorghum 
Cassava, 
cocoyam, 
plantain, yam 
Cowpea, 
groundnut 
Pepper, okra, 
eggplant 
Citurs, coffee, 
cashew 
Coastal 
Savannah 
Maize, rice Cassava Cowpea Tomato, 
shallot 
Coconut, 
pineapple, 
Guinea 
Savannah 
Maize, 
rice, 
sorghum, 
millet 
Cassava, yam Cowpea, 
groundnut, 
soybean, 
bambara 
Tomato, 
pepper 
Sheanuts, 
cashew 
Sudan 
Savannah 
Maize, 
rice, 
sorghum, 
millet 
Sweet potato Cowpea, 
groundnut, 
soybean, 
bambara 
Tomato, 
onion 
 
 Source: FAO, 2005 and MOFA, 2013. 
According to Food and Agricultural Organisation (2005) the physical and biological characteristics 
of the agro-ecosystem, as well as socioeconomic factors, dictate what crops and farming systems 
will produce the greatest benefits or lowest risk to the farmer and household. The major crops 
grown in the six agro-ecological zones are presented in Table 2. Maize and rice are grown in all 
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regions, while sorghum and millet are grown primarily in the transition and northern savannah 
zones. Starchy crops and vegetables are grown in all regions. Legumes production occurs in all 
regions except for the high rainforest, and tree crop production is common in all regions except 
for the Sudan Savannah. Tropical tree crops are also generally restricted to the southern agro-
ecological zones, with the exception of sheanut and cashew, which occur in the northern savannah.  
3.2 Source and Data Description 
This study seeks to examine the impact of climate related variables (precipitation and temperature) 
and other crop production inputs on mean per capita income from crop production and the 
variability in per capita income. Therefore, secondary data on food crop production and climate 
variables were obtained from some major research institutions in Ghana. Annual food crop 
production and the total cropped area for nine major crops (maize, rice, cassava, yam, cocoyam, 
plantain, millet, sorghum and groundnut) were obtained for all districts in Ghana from the 
Statistical, Research and Information Directorate (SRID) department of the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture (MOFA) from 1990 to 2015. Data on the average annual price of these crop was also 
obtained from the website of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Ghana Statistical 
Service (GSS). I also collected data on the total regional population and the number of people 
engaged in agriculture from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) from 1990 to 2015. Monthly data 
on climate variables (precipitation and temperature) were also obtained for all the 10 regions in 
Ghana from the Ghana Meteorological Agency (GMA) from 1990 to 2015.  
The analysis of crop production shows that the production of crops is very concentrated in some 
regions. The results show that, while rice is grown in all ten regions of Ghana, the top three regions 
(Northern, Upper East and Volta) accounted for nearly 74 percent of total national output. It can 
be observed that most of the crops produced in the country are concentrated in three regions (Brong 
Ahafo, Eastern and Ashanti) out of the ten regions. These three regions together produced over 
half of most of the food crops produced in the country. In particular, the Ashanti region, Brong 
Ahafo region and the Eastern region combined produce about 77.6%, 73.4%, 62.53%, 59.2% and 
58.2% of total cocoyam, plantain, cassava, maize and yam production in the country respectively. 
It is also important to note that, three out of the four cereal crops (rice, millet and sorghum) 
produced in the country are predominantly produced in the three northern regions of the country 
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with over half of rice production produced in these regions and millet and sorghum produced only 
in this part of the country (see Figure 2). 
 
Fig. 2: Share of crop produced in different regions from 1990-2015. 
Source: SRID of MOFA, 2016. 
 
The descriptive statistics of crop yield, which is measured by the ratio of crop production and area 
cultivated for each crop in each region, is presented in Table 3. It can be observed that even though 
the Northern region has the largest share of rice production in the region, Greater Accra region has 
the largest share of rice production per hectare with an average of 4.637mt/ha followed by the 
Volta region with rice productivity of 3.086mt/ha. Thus, in terms of productivity, the two regions 
with the large amount of rice production (Upper East and Northern region) are ranked third and 
fourth in the country with average productivity of 2.46 and 2.204mt/ha respectively. This implies 
that Greater Accra region the and the Volta region, which have the largest per hectare production, 
are the most productive regions in terms of land used for rice production. However, it is less risky 
to produce rice in the Northern region than in the Greater Accra and Volta region because the 
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northern region has the least amount of variation in yield (0.387mt/ha) compared with a variation 
of rice yield of 2.516mt/ha and 0.732mt/ha in the Greater Accra and Volta regions respectively. 
Also, even though the Brong Ahafo region has the highest mean productivity in maize, cassava 
and plantain in the country, it is less risky to produce these crops in other regions in the country. 
For example, it is less risky to produce maize and cassava in the Western region compared to 
production in the Brong Ahafo region. It is also less risky to produce plantain in the Eastern region, 
which has a variation in yield of 0.817mt/ha, compared to the variation in yield of 3.62mt/ha in 
the Brong Ahafo region. Yam and cocoyam were also found to be more productive in the Eastern 
region with an average productivity of 17.223 and 7.332mt/ha respectively. However, it is less 
risky to produce yam and cocoyam in in the Central and Western regions respectively compared 
to production in the other regions. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of crop productivity by regions in mt/ha (1990-2015). 
Crop 
 Western Central Volta Ashanti Eastern 
Brong 
Ahafo 
Greater 
Accra Northern 
Upper 
West 
Upper 
East 
Maize Mean 1.366 1.549 1.521 1.406 1.801 1.845 0.953 1.223 1.472 1.196 
 Std. Dev. 0.167 0.409 0.275 0.212 0.308 0.206 0.223 0.302 0.255 0.354 
Rice Mean 1.245 1.490 3.086 1.852 2.172 1.210 4.637 2.204 1.494 2.460 
 Std. Dev. 0.062 0.455 0.732 0.632 0.710 0.422 2.516 0.387 0.443 0.722 
Cassava Mean 9.699 13.29 15.12 11.97 14.81 15.42 7.961 9.376     
 Std. Dev. 1.105 3.074 1.793 3.644 4.395 2.184 3.397 3.614     
Yam Mean 6.921 5.242 12.07 11.91 17.22 14.94   11.40 13.70   
 Std. Dev. 1.271 0.517 2.144 2.673 1.564 3.045   3.500 3.333   
Cocoyam Mean 5.878 4.822 6.081 7.317 7.332 6.497         
 Std. Dev. 0.347 0.522 1.524 1.614 0.885 1.002         
Plantain Mean 8.286 6.864 6.575 9.119 9.052 9.772         
 Std. Dev. 1.220 1.486 1.012 1.364 0.817 3.620         
Millet Mean        1.904 0.881 0.841 
 Std. Dev.        1.609 0.173 0.211 
Sorghum Mean        1.154 1.028 0.971 
 Std. Dev.        0.421 0.195 0.219 
Groundnut Mean        1.093 1.289 0.895 
 Std. Dev.        0.439 0.235 0.148 
Real Per Mean 1250.1 1306.4 1251.7 1924.8 3206.4 3337.6 251.1 1795.7 2469.1 1092.8 
Capita Income Std. Dev. 574.01 807.83 626.99 1182.1 1669.5 1917.3 228.3 1026.0 1135.4 341.25 
Annual Total Mean 1904.1 1320.5 1381.9 1588.9 1596.8 1280.9 716.5 1083.8 1036.7 946.3 
Rainfall Std. Dev. 146.60 166.50 141.94 108.12 120.02 149.58 154.67 84.272 147.31 213.0 
Avg. Annual Mean 27.35 27.08 28.01 27.00 26.49 26.96 27.85 28.28 28.39 29.23 
Temperature Std. Dev. 0.278 0.337 0.274 0.630 0.266 0.446 0.422 0.279 0.332 0.322 
Source: SRID of MOFA, 2016. 
Trends in agricultural labour force over the last two and half decades are presented in Figure 3. As 
expected, the population of Ghana has been increasing in all regions of the country. The results of 
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the trend in agricultural labour force shows that, the number of people engaged in agriculture in 
the Northern region has increased tremendously over the last one and half decade after being 
virtually constant in the 1990s. The Greater Accra region, which is the second most populous 
region in the country after the Ashanti region is the region with the least number of people engaged 
in agriculture. Agricultural labour force in the Ashanti region has been declining over the last two 
and half decades. However, the region still contributes the third highest number of people engaged 
in agricultural in absolute terms after Northern and Brong Ahafo regions.  
 
Fig. 3: Trends in regional population and agricultural labour force from 1990-2015. 
The results on the real per capita income from crop production, which is measured by the ratio of 
real annual income to the agricultural labour force is presented in the bottom part of Table 3. The 
results show that the Brong Ahafo region earns the highest income per household with an average 
of GH¢3337.61 per year followed by the Eastern region, which earns an average of GH¢3206.44 
real per capita income per year from crop production. Real per capita earnings in the Greater Accra 
region was very low compared to earnings in the other regions with an average of GH¢251.07 per 
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year over the last two and half decades. The overall mean per capita income from crop production 
over the last two and half decade was GH¢1788.58 with a standard deviation of GH¢1411.45. The 
high standard deviations in all the regions indicates that purchasing power of income from crops 
have been highly variable over the years. 
The climate variables are time series of annual precipitation and annual average temperature from 
1990 to 2015. I used annual precipitation and annual average temperature in our analysis so as to 
be able to measure the impact of precipitation falling directly on crops (wet season precipitation) 
and the impact of inter-seasonal water accumulation on crop production (dry season precipitation). 
The summary statistics of annual precipitation and average annual temperature is provided Table 
3. The results show that the Eastern region is the coolest region in the country with an average 
temperature of 26.49°C followed by the Brong Ahafo region and the Ashanti region, with an 
annual average temperature of 26.96°C and 27.0°C respectively. The hottest region in the country 
was found to be the Upper East region with an average temperature of 29.23°C. The West region 
has the highest amount of precipitation during the year with an average annual rainfall of about 
1900mm. This is followed by the Eastern and Ashanti regions, which have an average of 1597mm 
and 1589mm per annum respectively over the last two and half decades. The Greater Accra region 
has the least amount of precipitation. 
4. Methodology 
The usual approach in modelling the relationship between productivity and inputs is based on the 
mean levels of inputs and outputs where the farmers’ decision problem is solved by equating the 
marginal value of output to factor costs. It is, however, widely recognized that agricultural 
production is stochastic and the levels inputs used also influence higher moments of the 
distribution of outputs (Just and Pope, 1979; Antle, 1983). This stochastic nature of agricultural 
production is a major source of risk. Consequently, variability in productivity is not only explained 
by factors out of the control of the farmer such as climate change, input and output prices but also 
by controllable factors such as varying of the levels of inputs (Just and Pope, 1979; Antle, 1983). 
In effect, it has been shown that a risk averse farmer uses less (more) of a risk-increasing (risk-
decreasing) factor than a risk neutral farmer. Risk, therefore has an important bearing on the 
production decisions of farmers as inputs selection does not only depend on their yield but also on 
their risk effects.  
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According to Hardaker et al. (1997), production decisions of farmers are also influenced by market 
risks, which are associated with the uncertainty about future prices of inputs and outputs and the 
reliability of input supplies. Therefore, even though market risks are essentially exogenous, 
farmers can affect the yield variability and the distribution of returns by the choice of inputs or the 
combination of inputs. In general, production risks have a tremendous impact on agriculture 
especially, the production patterns and supply behaviour of small holder farmers. Another form of 
risk that is not under the control of the farm can come from the changing climate. However, this 
risk can be minimized by the adoption of adaption strategies available to the farmer. 
To be able to identify the risky variables that affect per capita income from crop production in 
Ghana, a stochastic production function developed by Just and Pope (1978) was employed. This 
production function is the sum of a deterministic component that relates to the level of yield, a 
stochastic component that relates to the variability in the level of yield and is represented by the 
equation below: 𝑦"# = 𝑓(𝑋"#, 𝛽) + ℎ 𝑍"#, 𝛼 /.1𝜀"#                                                                                           (1) 
where yit is the natural log of per capita income from crop production for region (i) at time (t), Xit 
are the independent variables including climate variables and Zit may contain the same elements 
as Xit, εit is the stochastic term with zero mean and constant variance (σε2), β and α are parameters 
to be estimated. Per capita income from crop production is used as the dependent variable because 
it is the main source of livelihood for farmers (Schnitzer et al., 2014). I adopted the log-
transformation of the per capita income from crop production as the dependent variable because 
the findings reported by Schlenker et al. (2006) suggests that a log-transformation outperforms a 
linear specification, since the distribution of income is non-negative and typically highly skewed. 
The estimation of the first part of the above equation gives the average effect of the independent 
variables on per capita income, while estimating the second part of the equation gives the effect of 
each independent variable on the variance of per capita income (Chen et al., 2004). It is also 
important to note that increases and decreases in income variability as a result of change in the 
explanatory variables are determined by the sign of hz (Chen et al., 2004). This is because the Just 
and Pope production function does not impose ex ante restrictions on the risk effects of inputs 
considered in the model. In effect, Zit is said to be risk-increasing if it increases the variance of 
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crop yield, that is ℎ3 	> 	0, under uncertainty and decreasing otherwise. However, the variance 
function does not distinguish between upside or downside risk. In effect, following Antle (1983), 
I will also employ the third central moments (measuring skewness), which measures downside risk 
exposure. Therefore, the 𝑖#8 input can be said to affect downside risk exposure through its effect 
on skewness. For instance, the 𝑖#8 input would contribute to decreasing downside risk exposure 
when the differential of the third moment is greater than zero and vice versa. In particular, if the 
coefficient estimate of the  𝑖#8 input of the skewness function is positive, it implies that input i 
contributes to decreasing downside risk exposure. 
The Just and Pope Production function can be considered as an estimation with multiplicative 
heteroscedastic errors given as follows: 𝑦"# = 𝑓 𝑋"#, 𝛽 + 𝜇"#                                                                                                                  (2) 
where 𝜇"# = ℎ 𝑍"#, 𝛼 /.1𝜀"# is a disturbance term with zero mean and variance:  𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝜇"# ≡ 𝜎?@AB = 𝜎Bℎ 𝑍"#, 𝛼 B                                                                                                (3) 
This production function has traditionally been estimated by the three-stage Feasible Generalized 
Least Squares (FGLS) approach. However, Saha et al. (1997) show that Maximum Likelihood 
Estimates (MLEs) are more efficient and unbiased than FGLS estimates for small samples in 
Monte Carlo experiments. The maximum likelihood method will be employed to estimate this 
model. This is because in other types of heteroscedastic model where the FGLS method is applied, 
the consistency of the estimates of α guarantees efficient estimate of β and hence little concern is 
given for the efficiency of α estimates (Chen et al., 2004). Since this study will capture the risk 
effects of inputs, the efficiency of α estimates are very important. The likelihood function would 
therefore be: 
𝐿 = DBE F B D8 G@A,H D B 𝑒𝑥𝑝 L M@ALN G@A,O PB8(G@A,H)Q"RDS#RD                                                      (4) 
where n is the number of zones and τ is the number of time periods and 𝑁 = 𝑛𝜏. The log-likelihood 
function would then be given by the expression below: 
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𝑙𝑛𝐿 = − DB 	𝑁 ∗ ln 2𝜋 + 𝑙𝑛 ℎ 𝑋"#, 𝛼 + M@ALN G@A,O P8(G@A,H)Q"RDS#RDQ"RDS#RD                    (5) 
Maximising this equation provides a maximum likelihood estimates of the parameter vectors β and 
α. 
4.1 Panel Unit Root Test 
The panel data estimation processes relate crop productivity to exogenous variables and this 
procedure results in estimates of the impact of the exogenous variables on levels and the variances 
of the output. It is assumed by the model that all the included variables are stationary, and hence 
deterministic and stochastic trends in variables can introduce spurious correlations between 
variables, as the errors in the data generating processes for different series might not be 
independent (Chen et al., 2004). In effect, a positive trend existent in agricultural crop yields can 
be accounted for by introducing deterministic time trend. However, even after introducing the time 
trend the correlation between variables remains spurious. Therefore, testing for stationarity of the 
variables may help satisfy ideal conditions for the regression which will result in appropriate 
inferences. I, therefore, consider a simple panel data model with first order autoregressive 
component with 𝑦"# = 𝜌"𝑦",#LD + 𝑀"#𝛾" + 𝜂"#	                                                                                                   (6) 
Where yit is the variable to be tested and ηit is a stationary error term. The term Mit can represent 
panel specific means, panel specific means and a time trend or nothing. The model can be rewritten 
as: 𝛥𝑦"# = 𝜙"𝑦",#LD + 𝑀"#𝛾" + 𝜂"#                                                                                                (7) 
where 𝛥𝑦"# = 𝑦"# − 𝑦"#LD and 𝜙" = 𝜌" − 1 with a null hypothesis of 𝐻/: 𝜙" = 0 for all 𝑖 (presence 
of panel unit root) versus the alternative hypothesis of no panel unit root (𝐻g: 𝜙" < 0 for at least 
one 𝑖). The Fisher type panel unit root test proposed by Madalla and Wu (1999) which combines 
p-values of unit root test for each cross-section unit for test of unit root in panel data was adopted. 
This test was used because of its advantages over other test like the Im–Pesaran–Shin (see 
Maddalla and Wu, 1999; Choi, 2001) and it is also able to handle unbalanced panels. The decision 
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rule for the Fisher type test is that the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis, for at least one i at the significant level α when P > cpα, where cpα is the upper tail of 
the chi-square distribution with 2N degrees of freedom (Choi, 2001). 
The results of the Philip Perron (PP) Fisher panel unit root revealed that the total cropped area and 
the real per capita income from agriculture are stationary. All the other variables that are related 
to the climate were also found to be stationary (see Table 5). 
Table 5: Unit Root Test Results with individual effects and individual linear trends. 
Variable  Statistics p-value 
Real Per Capita Income 55.572*** 0.0000 
Total Cropped Area  138.688*** 0.0000 
Agricultural Labour Force 34.787** 0.0213 
Climate    
Annual Average Temperature  46.211*** 0.0008 
Annual Precipitation 185.067*** 0.0000 
Variability in Average Temperature 170.012*** 0.0000 
Variability in Annual Precipitation 190.157*** 0.0000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
To be able to estimate the model, we must specify the forms of the mean and variance functions 
explicitly. Following Isik and Devadoss (2006) and Palanisami et al. (2011), the following 
quadratic form is assumed for the mean function: 𝑓 𝑋"#, 𝛽 = 𝛽/ + 𝛽D𝐴 + 𝛽B𝐴B + 𝛽j𝐿 + 𝛽k𝐿B + 𝛽1𝑡 + 𝛽m𝑡B + 𝛽n𝑃 + 𝛽p𝑃B +																								+𝛽q𝑇 + 𝛽D/𝑇B + 𝛽DD𝑉𝑃 + 𝛽DB𝑉𝑇                                                                      (8)                               
where A is, the area cultivated for crops, which is used as a proxy for farmer’s wealth and access 
to land, L is total regional agricultural labour force, P is precipitation, VP is variability in 
precipitation, T is temperature, VT is variability in Temperature, t is time, which is used as a proxy 
for change in technology, institutional changes and CO2 fertilization (Attavanich and McCarl, 
2011). The variance function 𝜎sBℎ 𝑍"#; 𝛼, 𝜂 B with 𝜎sD = 1 was assumed to have an exponential 
form with 									ℎ 𝑍"#, 𝛼 = exp 𝛼𝑍"# 	= 𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝛼/ + 𝛼D𝐴 + 𝛼B𝐴B + 𝛼j𝐿 + 𝛼k𝐿B + 𝛼1𝑡 + 𝛼m𝑡B +																																																						+	𝛼n𝑃 + 𝛼p𝑃B + 𝛼q𝑇 + 𝛼D/𝑇B + 𝛼DD𝑉𝑃 + 𝛼DB𝑉𝑇             (9)                                                                                            
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This form of variance function is developed by Harvey (1976) and is employed subsequently in 
several studies (Asche and Tveteras, 1999; Isik and Khanna, 2003; Isik and Devadoss, 2006; 
Palanisami et al., 2011). I also estimated linear forms for both the mean, variance skewness 
functions. 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
An important step that must be considered before the estimation is done is data exploration. To 
begin, I tested to find out whether heteroscedasticity was present in the models using a Breusch-
Pagan test. The results show that the null hypothesis of constant variance should be rejected at 1 
percent significant level for both the linear and quadratic models (χ2 (1) = 24.6 and χ2 (12) = 32.98). 
I also tested to find out, whether autocorrelation was present in the model or not by testing for 
autocorrelation by region. The Durbin-Watson test was used and the results show that the test was 
non-conclusive in almost all the regional models, except the Eastern region, the Brong Ahafo 
region and the Northern region where the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation was not rejected. 
I, therefore, estimate the models by correcting for heteroscedasticity by using the maximum 
likelihood estimation. In estimating the standard panel model, we must compare the random effects 
model with the fixed effects model. I prefer the fixed effects model to the random effects model 
for all of the estimation, because the regions are ‘one of a kind’ and cannot be viewed as a random 
draw from some underlying population. However, since the maximum likelihood method uses a 
random effects option for its estimation, the random effect method was adopted. 
Before estimating the models, I presented the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables 
used in the model in Table 6. The results show that on the average the total amount of land used 
to cultivate the 8 crops considered is about 3173.72 km2, which is about 25 percent of the total 
land area used to cultivate annual crops in 2015 (MOFA, 2016).  The results also show that, the 
average number of people engaged in agriculture over the last two and half decade was about 
420790 per year. The average temperature and average total precipitation in Ghana are 27.66°C 
and 1285.63mm respectively. 
The regression coefficients for the mean, variance and skewness of real per capita income from 
agriculture models (linear and quadratic functions) from the maximum likelihood estimation of 
the stochastic production function are presented in Table 7. The results of the mean per capita 
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model for both the linear and quadratic forms showed expected signs in general. For instance, crop 
area cultivated, which is used as a proxy for farmer’s wealth and access to land has a positive effect 
on per capita income from crops in the linear model, suggesting that an increase in the total land 
area by 1 unit will lead to an increase in per capita income by 0.0002%. Similar result was found 
in the quadratic model. In particular, the area cultivated had a concave relationship with per capita 
income from crops, indicating that investing more land in the production of these crops could 
increase the per capita income from these crops in general. However, as more and more land is 
invested, the gain in per capita income begins to diminish. This result confirms the general 
expectation that larger planting areas for a crop should lead to lower average production since 
more marginal and less suited land is then cultivated. In general, area cultivated was found to have 
a risk increasing effect on the variability in per capita income. However, it was found to contribute 
to decreasing downside risk exposure. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistic of Explanatory variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Total Area (‘000) 317.37 177.63 10.82 1038.56 
Total Area sq. (‘000,000,000) 132.98 133.98 0.117 1078.62 
Agric. Labour Force (‘000) 420.79 185.05 88.22 898.79 
Agric. Labour Force sq. 
(‘000,000,000) 211.18 161.15 7.78 807.83 
Trend 13.5 7.51 1 26 
Trend sq. 238.5 209.03 1 676 
Average Temperature 27.66 0.87 25.73 29.94 
Average Temperature sq. 766.04 48.43 661.79 896.6 
Annual Precipitation 1285.63 365.56 366.4 2176.7 
Annual Precipitation sq. (‘000) 1785.92 956.92 134.25 4738.02 
Variability in Temp. 2.25 1.33 0.39 7.52 
Variability in Precipitation (‘000) 7.79 3.75 1.09 25.2 
The number of people engage in agriculture was found to have a significant negative effect on real 
per capita income, which in general implies that agriculture labour force grows slightly faster than 
the growth in agriculture income in general. That is, an increase in agricultural labour force leads 
to a less than proportionate increase in agricultural income. In effect, encouraging more individuals 
to engage in agriculture without making efforts to improve the growth in income from agriculture 
will not be a very productive policy. Increases in agricultural labour force was also found to have 
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a significant risk-decreasing effect on the variability in real per capita income but contribute to 
increasing downside risk exposure. 
The trend variable is usually interpreted as the effect of technology and/or institutional changes on 
crop production (Chen et al., 2004; Isik and Devadoss, 2006; McCarl et al., 2008; Palanisami et 
al., 2011). However, this may generate incorrect estimates of the real effect of technological 
change on crop yield since atmospheric CO2 is also a potential key driver of potential yield 
impacts. Since it is difficult to unravel the difference between time and CO2 effects because of the 
perfect collinearity between time and atmospheric CO2 plus the small variation of atmospheric 
CO2 concentration across locations (Attavanich and McCarl, 2011), our time trend variable will 
implicitly capture both the effects of CO2 fertilization, technological progress and/or institutional 
changes and improvement in the accessibility of market. 
The results show that, the trend variable has a significant positive effect on real per capita income 
from food crop production in Ghana, in general. This confirms the results of Chen et al. (2004), 
Isik and Devadoss (2006), McCarl et al. (2008) and that of Palanisami et al. (2011), who found 
that improved technology augments both the mean and variability of crop yield. This implies that 
real per capita income continues to increase as technology continues to progress and there are more 
effective institutional changes and also as a result of increasing atmospheric CO2 fertilization. This 
is because the negative effect of the square of trend in the quadratic model was statistically 
insignificant. In effect, I can conclude that technology advancement and more improvement in 
institutions can help improve the per capita income from crop production. Even though, the trend 
variable, which is used as a proxy for technology advancement, institutional changes and 
increasing atmospheric CO2 fertilization, has a significant positive effect on the mean of per capita 
income, the results show that it has a risk increasing effect on the variability of per capita income. 
The results also show shows that trend has a positive effect on the skewness of real per capita 
income and thereby contributes to decreasing downside risk exposure. This implies that technology 
advancement, institutional changes and atmospheric CO2 fertilization reduces the probability of 
crop failure resulting in increasing real per capita income. 
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Table 7: ML Estimated Coefficients from Mean, Variance and Skewness Function Regressions 
Variables Linear Model Quadratic Model 
 Mean Variance Skewness Mean Variance Skewness 
Area 2.0e-06*** 5.7e-07*** 8.6e-07*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
  (2.5e-07) (4.5e-09) (6.7e-09) (0.001) (2.6e-05) (4.0e-05) 
Area Sq    -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
     (0.001) (2.46e-05) (3.69e-05) 
Agric Lab -7.3e-07** -2.1e-07*** -3.2e-07*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (3.3e-07) (4.9e-09) (7.3e-09) (0.001) (3.3e-05) (5.0e-05) 
Agric Lab sq.    0.004*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
     (0.001) (2.9e-05) (4.4e-05) 
Trend 0.057*** 0.016*** 0.0240*** 0.058*** 0.0190*** 0.029*** 
  (0.003) (7.7e-05) (0.0001) (0.011) (0.0004) (0.001) 
Trend sq.    -0.0003 -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
     (0.0003) (1.3e-05) (1.9e-05) 
Avg Temp. 0.06 0.017*** 0.026*** 4.778*** 1.405*** 2.107*** 
  (0.059) (0.001) (0.002) (1.551) (0.058) (0.087) 
Avg Temp. sq.    -0.086*** -0.025*** -0.038*** 
     (0.029) (0.001) (0.002) 
Rainfall -0.0001 -3.1e-05*** -4.7e-05*** -0.0004 -9.4e-05*** -0.0001*** 
  (0.0001) (2.8e-06) (4.1e-06) (0.0004) (1.5e-05) (2.3e-05) 
Rainfall sq.    5.3e-05 5.6e-06 8.4e-06 
     (0.0002) (5.5e-06) (8.3e-06) 
Var. Temp. 0.029 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.017 0.003*** 0.005*** 
  (0.030) (0.001) (0.001) (0.029) (0.001) (0.002) 
Var. Rain -6.1e-06 -1.7e-06*** -2.6e-06*** -0.008 -0.003*** -0.004*** 
  (7.8e-06) (2.0e-07) (3.0e-07) (0.007) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Constant 4.501*** 3.167*** 4.751*** -59.36*** -15.63*** -23.45*** 
  (1.671) (0.028) (0.042) (21.11) (0.794) (1.191) 
Sigma_u 0.618*** 0.0004 0.001 0.625*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 
  (0.149) (0.0016) (0.002) (0.172) (0.002) (0.003) 
Sigma_e 0.271*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.242*** 0.010*** 0.014*** 
  (0.012) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.011) (0.0004) (0.001) 
Observations 260 260 260 260 260 260 
Number of id 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
With regard to the climate variables, I found out that annual precipitation has a no significant 
correlation on the real per capita income. However, the results show that precipitation has a 
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negative significant effect on the variability in real per capita income. This implies that 
precipitation can be considered as a risk decreasing input in the production of crops. The results 
also show that precipitation has a significant negative effect on the skewness of real per capita 
income from crops, indicating that precipitation increases the probability of crop failure resulting 
in low real per capita income. 
Real per capita income from crop response to average temperature was found to be concave. This 
implies that rising average temperature increases real per capita income from crops. However, this 
increase in real per capita income begins to diminish as average temperature continuous to rise 
above a maximum threshold of 27.78°C. This confirms the findings of USGCRP (2009), which 
states that, crops tend to grow faster in warmer conditions in general, and the effect of increased 
temperature for any particular crop depends on the crop's optimal temperature for the crop’s 
growth and reproduction. Therefore, rising average temperature can result in increased 
productivity of a crop depending on the area. It is however, argued that, if warming exceeds a 
crop's optimum temperature, productivity can decline (USGCRP, 2009). 
The results also show that average temperature has a concave relationship with the variation in 
real per capita income from crops. This implies that below a certain threshold maximum 
temperature (27.78°C), rising average temperature has a risk increasing effect on the variability in 
real per capita income from crops. However, above this maximum threshold, rising temperature 
tends to have significant risk decreasing effect on the variability in real per capita income. The 
effect of temperature on the skewness of real per capita income was also concave, suggesting that 
below the maximum threshold of 27.78°C, rising average temperature reduces the probability of 
crop failure and thereby increasing real per capita income from crops. However, above this 
maximum threshold, rising average temperature increases the probability of crop failure and, thus, 
reduces real per capita income from crops.  
Both variability in precipitation and temperature do not have any significant effect on real per 
capita income from crops. They, however, have a differentiated effect on the variance and 
skewness of real per capita income. In particular, variability in average temperature was found to 
have significant positive effect on both the variance and skewness of real per capita income, 
whereas variability in annual precipitation was found to have significant negative effect on the 
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variance and skewness of real per capita income. This implies that, whereas variability in average 
temperature has a risk increasing effect on real per capita income, variability in annual 
precipitation was found to have a risk decreasing effect on real per capita income. Also, whereas 
variability in average temperature was found to reduce the probability of crop failure, variability 
in annual total precipitation was found to increase the probability of crop failure and thus reduces 
real per capita income. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
Risk and uncertainty are ubiquitous and varied within the agricultural sector in both developed and 
developing countries, and even though the sources and consequences may differ between countries 
they are generally experienced by most farmers in most countries. For instance, crop production 
in Ghana is risky as it is mainly rain-fed and prone to a number of shocks including: climatic 
shocks, pest and diseases, bushfires and price shocks (Choudhary et al., 2015). According to 
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), while several factors contribute to household income 
variability, rainfall variability is likely to influence welfare the most, particularly because it is 
spatially covariant. Barret et al. (2007) also argues that, weather risks and climate shocks are 
critically important constraints to wealth accumulation, particularly for those in rural areas who 
are either engaged in agricultural activities or have their livelihoods tied to the well-being of the 
farming sector. 
In effect, before we institute policies to whether adapt or mitigate the effects of climate shocks on 
income from crop production and the effectiveness of policies to reduce these impacts, this study 
investigated how climate variability and other agricultural inputs affect real per capita agricultural 
income by using an econometric model to estimate a stochastic production function that quantifies 
the effects of these variables on the mean, variance and skewness of real per capita income from 
9 food crops produced in the country.  
The descriptive analysis of cropped area revealed that the total area cultivated has increased by 
about 16 percent over the last decade. It was, however, shown that the land area used to cultivate 
crops in the Greater Accra and Upper East regions has declined over the last decade. These two 
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regions are also the regions with the lowest per capita income from agriculture in the country. The 
descriptive analysis of climate variables also revealed the Eastern region to be the coolest region 
in the country with the three northern regions being the hottest regions. The Volta region was also 
found to be the hottest region in the southern part of the country. The region with the highest 
amount of precipitation during the year is the Western region.  
The results show that trend variable, which is usually interpreted as the effect of technology and/or 
institutional changes, market access and CO2 fertilization on crop production in the literature, was 
found to have a significant positive impact on real per capita income from crop production. It was 
also revealed that, even though trend has a risk increasing effect on the variability of real per capita 
income, it reduces the probability of crop failure resulting in increasing real per capita income. 
Crop area cultivated, which is used as a proxy for farmer’s wealth and access to land was also 
found to have significant concave relationship with real per capita income from crop production, 
indicating that investing more land in the production of food crops could increase the per capita 
income from crops in general but as more and more land is invested, the gain in per capita income 
begins to diminish. Area cultivated was also found to contribute to decreasing downside risk 
exposure. The number of people engage in agriculture was found to have a significant negative 
effect on real per capita income, which in general implies that agriculture labour force grows 
slightly faster than the growth in agriculture income in general. 
One major finding of this study was the effect of annual average temperature on real per capita 
income from crops, which was found to be significantly concave. This implies that rising average 
temperature increases real per capita income. However, the increase in real per capita income 
diminishes as average temperature increases above a maximum 27.78°C. The results also show 
that rising temperature has a risk increasing effect on the variability in real per capita income below 
this maximum threshold and a risk decreasing effect otherwise. It was also revealed by the results 
that rising average temperature reduces the probability of crop failure and thereby increasing real 
per capita income from crop below the maximum threshold. However, above this maximum 
threshold, rising average temperature increases the probability of crop failure and thus reduces real 
per capita income from crops. The results also show that annual precipitation has no significant 
correlation with the real per capita income. It was, however, found to have a risk decreasing effect 
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on the variability in real per capita income but increases the probability of crop failure resulting in 
low real per capita income. 
Both variability in precipitation and temperature do not have any significant effect on the level 
real per capita income from crops. However, whereas variability in average temperature has a risk 
increasing effect on real per capita income, variability in annual precipitation was found to have a 
risk decreasing effect on real per capita income. Also, whereas variability in average temperature 
was found to reduce the probability of crop failure, variability in annual total precipitation was 
found to increase the probability of crop failure and thus reduces real per capita income. Therefore, 
future research will focus on how different degree of exposure to the risk flood, which is caused 
by variation in precipitation, impact on the behavioral traits of farmers and their decision-making 
process in adopting adaptation strategies. 
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Abstract 
Contrary to standard economic hypothesis that individuals' preferences are fixed, a 
growing body of research indicates that there is an endogenous link between 
individuals' living environment and their economic preferences. This study 
investigates whether risk preferences, time preferences, social cooperation and loss 
aversion reacts to the environment by means of a field experiment in rural Ghana. 
In particular, this study exploits a natural experiment implied by different degree of 
exposure to risk in terms of flood and the effects these risks have on the behavioural 
traits of farmers, and their willingness to adopt adaptation strategies. The results 
show that preferences are not stable, with exposure to risks making people more risk 
averse, impatient and more cooperative. Even though each behavioural trait has a 
significant effect on adoption of adaptation strategies, only risk preferences are 
significant when all economic preferences are assessed together, indicating that risk 
preferences have a strong and significant effect on adaptation strategies. Also, 
exposure to different degree of risk has a significant effect on adaptation strategies, 
but the main channel through which it impacts respondents’ adaptation decisions is 
through risk aversion. In particular, being exposed to high degree of risk makes 
respondents less likely to access credit to invest in their farms, more willing to pay 
higher agricultural insurance premium and more willing to contribute higher 
amount for the construction of drainage systems to reduce the impact of flood on 
their farms and households. In effect, by reducing the exposure to risk, policy makers 
can obtain less risk averse households and thereby making it easier to implement 
adaptation strategies. 
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1. Introduction  
Risk and uncertainty play a significant role in almost every important economic decision. The 
extent to which people are willing to undertake decisions with uncertain outcomes constitutes 
their economic preferences. Therefore, assessing and measuring the economic preferences of 
individuals is critical for economic analysis and policy prescriptions (Charness et al., 2013). 
For example, risk preference is identified as one of the main drivers of farm management and 
land use decisions (Chavas et al., 2010; Jin et al., 2015) and, also, plays a major role in 
agricultural production decision (Feder, 1980; Just and Zilberman, 1983; Adger et al., 2009). 
Available research indicates that risk aversion inhibits the use of new, productivity increasing 
technologies and inputs such as improved seeds and fertilizers (Feder et al, 1985; Rosenzweig 
and Binswanger, 1983; Knight et al., 2003; Engle-Warnick et al. 2011; Dercon and 
Christiaensen, 2011; Liu 2013; Verschoor et al., 2016). 
Previous studies assumed the interaction between economic preferences and the environment 
to be stable and then examined how a change in risk constraints induces a behavioural change. 
Contrary to this standard economic hypothesis that individual’s preferences are stable, a 
growing body of research indicates that there is an endogenous link between individuals living 
environment and their economic preferences. For instance, Eckel et al. (2009) reported that 
individuals affected by hurricane Katrina exhibited significant risk loving behaviours. Other 
studies also suggest that preferences endogenously change with external cues such as market 
arrangements (Palacios-Huerta and Santos, 2004), civil war shocks (Voors et al., 2012), 
tsunamis (Callen, 2015), earth quakes (Cameron and Shah, 2012) and volcanic threats (Ali 
Bchir and Willinger, 2013). The results of these studies indicate that individuals’ preferences 
are partly influenced by their social, institutional or natural environment. 
The effect of the environment on preferences can be linked to background risk, which states 
that the presence of risks that cannot be avoided or insured against may make individuals less 
tolerant towards other, avoidable risks (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987; Kimball, 1993; Eekhoudt 
et al., 1996). It is worth noting that, before Eckel et al. (2009), the link between background 
risk and preferences was mainly focused on financial decisions (Guiso et al., 1996; Heaton and 
Lucas, 2001; Guiso and Paiella, 2008), and in the laboratory (Harrison et al., 2007; Lee, 2008; 
Lusk and Coble, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, Eckel et al. (2009) were the first to use 
field experiments to establish the link between a natural disaster (hurricane Katrina in US) and 
individuals’ economics preference. Surprisingly, their results indicate that respondents affected 
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by Katrina exhibit risk-loving behaviour. The emotional state of respondents was indicated as 
the reason for this result. 
However, researchers are yet to build a consensus on how economic preferences vary with 
different exposure to background risk, with different research having contrasting results. For 
example, while Cameron and Shah (2012) reported that respondents exposed to flood and 
earthquake in Indonesia exhibit higher levels of risk aversion compared to unexposed 
respondents, Ali Bchir and Willinger (2013) reported that there was no significant effect on 
households exposed to volcanic threats on risk preferences. Voors et al. (2012) also reported 
that shocks such as flood and drought do not have significant impact on risk preferences but 
conflicts make respondents more risk seeking. A study by Reynaud and Aubert (2013) also 
suggest that villages in Vietnam affected by a flood in recent years exhibit more risk aversion 
in the loss domain. On the effects of the environment on time preferences, whereas Callen 
(2015) revealed that Sri Lankan workers affected by tsunami in 2004 were more patient, Ali 
Bchr and Willinger (2013) report that poor households in villages exposed to volcanic threats 
in Peru exhibit more impatient behaviours. 
Economic preferences have often been measured in advanced countries in the lab with not so 
much being done in the field in developing countries, and thus making it important to assess 
preferences in developing countries. Risk and uncertainty are predominant in agriculture, 
which plays a dominant role in the livelihoods of households in developing countries, serving 
as a stimulus for economic growth, providing food security and assisting in poverty reduction. 
However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, poverty and food insecurity are critical issues for most 
countries with one of the major cause of these problems attributed to agriculture’s susceptibility 
to production, price and policy risks which impact farmers’ income and welfare (Cervantes-
Godoy et al., 2013; Ellis, 2017). It is also important to assess economic preferences in 
developing countries because preferences among farmers have been identified as important 
constraints that keep farmers from reaching their productive potential. For example, poor 
households in developing countries are reluctant to invest in new technologies because of risk 
aversion and high impatience levels (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009; Tanaka et al., 2010). Boucher 
et al. (2008) also argue that some farmers in Peru are not willing to access formal credit market, 
even if it would help raise their productivity and income levels because of risk aversion. 
Furthermore, Carter and Barrett (2006) argue that risk aversion may lock poor agricultural 
households in poverty traps. 
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In addition, it is easy to find different degree of exposure to extreme conditions in developing 
countries. For example, climate shocks, which include erratic rainfall, increases the risks faced 
by farmers by negatively affecting yields of most crops in developing countries (Nelson et al., 
2009). This climate shock is ranked among the most pervasive stresses that rural households 
face (Ziervogel and Calder, 2003), especially in developing countries where rural livelihoods 
are inextricably linked to the natural environment (Mensah and Adu, 2015). However, the risks 
posed by the consequences of climate shock can be lowered by adaptation, which is considered 
the most important policy option in reducing the impact of climate shock (IPCC, 2014). 
Adaptation strategies involves changes in agricultural management practices in response to 
changes in climate conditions and it often involves a combination of various individual 
responses at the farm-level and assumes that farmers have access to alternative practices and 
technologies available in the region. However, most of these strategies are characterised by 
risk and uncertainty, which makes it more prudent to understand the link between farmers’ 
preferences and how they respond to new programs that are crucial for policymakers in 
reducing the impact of natural shocks on households. 
This study will, therefore, test in a clean way by means of a field experiment, using a between 
subject design, not only replicating Cameron and Shah (2012) and Ali Bchir and Willinger 
(2013) on the effects of exposure to risk on risk and time preferences, but also loss aversion 
and cooperation. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates how 
preferences react to different degree of exposure to risk in a between subject design 
investigating a large spectrum of preferences. In particular, it is the first paper investigating the 
link between exposure to risk and cooperation. This would be done by exploiting a natural 
experiment implied by exposing respondents to different degree of risk in terms of flood and 
the effects this risk have on the behavioural traits of the respondents. In effect, communities 
that are highly prone to the risk of flood would be considered as our treated group and the least 
susceptible to flood communities considered as our control group. 
This study would also be used to investigate how economic preferences influence households’ 
decision-making process in adopting adaptation strategies. A total of four adaptation strategies 
were considered but only three of them, which include willingness to access credit, willingness 
to pay for agricultural crop insurance and willingness to pay for a drainage system, were 
analysed. Farmers’ willingness to pay for fertilizers was not included in the analysis because I 
perceived that respondents who are in the treated group will be less likely to pay high amount 
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for fertilizers. Indeed, the results show that there are highly significant differences in the 
willingness to pay for fertilizers between the two groups. On the willingness to pay for drainage 
systems and fertilizers, respondents were asked to indicate how much they would be willing to 
sacrifice in monetary terms in order to reduce the impact of climate shocks on their households 
and farms by paying for drainage systems and fertilizers. In all, a dichotomous contingent 
valuation method (CVM) with follow up questions, which is used to reduce strategic biases in 
CVM, was used. In the case of households’ willingness to access formal financial credit and 
purchase of agricultural insurance, an initial decision on whether to access credit and purchase 
insurance was asked and a subsequent decision on the maximum amount respondents are 
willing to access as credit and the maximum willingness to pay as insurance premium 
conditional on a positive initial decision was determined. 
The results show that economic preferences are not stable, with different degree of exposure 
to risk having significant impact on individual's risk preferences, impatience level and 
cooperation. In particular, the results show that exposure to risk makes people more risk averse, 
more impatient and more cooperative. Respondents in this study exhibited strong degree of 
risk aversion in general, contradicting the results of Vieider and L’Haridon (2016), which 
indicates that subjects in developing countries are generally less risk averse. However, more 
risk aversion behaviour of respondents in this study may be as a result of the fact that both the 
treated and control groups are exposed to some degree of background risk, thereby making the 
whole sample more risk averse and confirming the theory of the relationship between 
background risk and risk preferences (Cameron and Shah, 2012). Also, exposure to high degree 
of risk has a significant effect on adaptation strategies, but the main channel through which it 
impacts respondents’ adaptation decisions is through risk aversion. In particular, the results 
show that being exposed to high degree of risk makes respondents less likely to access credit 
to invest in their farms, more willing to pay higher agricultural insurance premium and more 
willing to contribute higher amount for the construction of drainage systems to reduce the 
impact of flood on their farms and households. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. The second section looks at the conceptual framework 
where I summarize the experimental tasks used to elicit economic preferences. The 
experimental design and procedure are summarized in the third section, while the methodology 
used to analyse the results is presented in the fourth section. The fifth section presents the 
results of the paper and the sixth section concludes the paper. 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
There are two broad approaches identified in the literature for eliciting economic preferences 
of individuals: survey and experimental methods (Charness et al., 2013). Whereas, the survey 
method uses questionnaire to elicit risk preferences by asking individuals about personal traits 
that are directly related to risk aversion (Cesarini et al., 2009; Couture et al., 2010; Charness 
and Viceisza, 2016; Dohmen et al., 2011) and impatience levels (Atmadja, 2008; Ubfal, 2016), 
the experimental approach uses experiments to observe the choices of subjects that reflect each 
individual’s risk (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Holt and Laury, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; 
Crosetto and Filippin, 2013) and time preferences (Coller and Williams, 1999). The major 
drawback of the survey method is that, questionnaires are typically not directly incentivized 
and thus raises questions about whether the elicited risk preferences reflect an individual’s true 
attitudes toward risk (Charness et al., 2013). The experimental approach solves this problem 
by designing experiments where many of the experimental factors are controlled by the 
experimenter and thus ensuring that the elicited risk measure is influenced only by the 
individuals’ risk (Jin et al., 2015) and time preference. 
Economic field experiments exploring economic preferences in both developed and developing 
countries have a long tradition. Most studies assumed the interaction between economic 
preferences and the environment to be stable. However, more recent studies have shown that 
there is an endogenous link between individuals’ economic preferences and their living 
environment. Most of these studies have often being done in the lab and developed countries 
(Beaud and Willinger, 2012; Herberich and List, 2012; Eckel et al., 2009; Lee, 2008; Lusk and 
Coble, 2008; Harrison et al., 2007) with only a few being done in developing countries (Ali 
Bchr and Willinger, 2013; Voors et al., 2012; Cameron and Shah, 2012). In this study, I 
contribute to the literature by not only replicating Cameron and Shah (2012) and Ali Bchir and 
Willinger (2013) on the effects of exposure to risk on risk and time preferences, but also on 
loss aversion and cooperation. This will help in investigating how preferences react to different 
degree of exposure to risk in a between subject design investigating a large spectrum of 
preferences. In this section, I look at the conceptual framework, which summarizes the 
experimental tasks used to elicit economic preferences used in this study. 
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2.1 Risk Preferences 
The expected utility theory states that a rational individual chooses between risky or uncertain 
prospects by comparing their expected utility values. In other words, the theory of expected 
utility is the weighted sums obtained by adding the utility values of outcomes multiplied by 
their respective probabilities (Mongin, 1998). That is, 𝐸𝑈𝑇 = 𝑝"𝑢(𝑥")Q"RD                                                                                                                    (1) 
where 𝑢(𝑥") is the level of utility derived from the final wealth which occurs with probability 𝑝" for each of the n possible outcomes. When the utility function is concave, the individual is 
said to be risk averse, preferring a sure income of 𝑥" to a fair gamble with expected value of 𝑥". Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) measure risk aversion as 𝑟 𝑥 = −{||(}){|(}) , where the risk 
averse individual is represented by 𝑟(𝑥) 	> 	0, the risk preferring individual by 𝑟(𝑥) 	< 	0 and 
the risk neutral individuals by 𝑟(𝑥) 	= 	0.  
Several approaches have been used to estimate the risk aversion of subjects. Most of these 
techniques are incentivised, although non-incentivised questions have also been used 
successfully in recent years. Also, some researchers favour the theoretical elegance of more 
sophisticated approaches, whereas others prefer the simpler approaches on the basis of the ease 
of comprehension and the greater probability of obtaining meaningful responses. The most 
commonly used risk elicitation technique in the literature is the multiple price list (MPL), 
which was first used by Binswanger (1980) to elicit risk preferences of farmers in rural India 
and later used by other researchers to price commodities (Kahneman et al., 1990) and elicits 
discount rates (Coller and Williams, 1999). However, the method was popularised by Holt and 
Laury (2002) to estimate risk parameters of a utility function (see Andersen et al., 2006 for a 
complete review of the model).  
The MPL is a standard format, whereby subjects are provided with a fixed array of paired 
lottery options and asked to choose one option per pair (see Table 1). One main advantage of 
MPL design is that it can be explained to subjects and implemented with relative ease and also 
promotes honest answers (Andersen et al., 2006). However, Charness and Viceisza (2016) 
reported that this mechanism does not induce sensible and realistic choices among rural 
households citing low level of understanding of the method as the main problem. 
Table 1: The ten-paired lottery-choice decisions of the MPL. 
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 Option A Option B Option A Option B 
1 1/10 of $2, 9/10 of $1.6 1/10 of $3.85, 9/10 of $0.1   
2 2/10 of $2, 8/10 of $1.6 2/10 of $3.85, 8/10 of $0.1   
3 3/10 of $2, 7/10 of $1.6 3/10 of $3.85, 7/10 of $0.1   
4 4/10 of $2, 6/10 of $1.6 4/10 of $3.85, 6/10 of $0.1   
5 5/10 of $2, 5/10 of $1.6 5/10 of $3.85, 5/10 of $0.1   
6 6/10 of $2, 4/10 of $1.6 6/10 of $3.85, 4/10 of $0.1   
7 7/10 of $2, 3/10 of $1.6 7/10 of $3.85, 3/10 of $0.1   
8 8/10 of $2, 2/10 of $1.6 8/10 of $3.85, 2/10 of $0.1   
9 9/10 of $2, 1/10 of $1.6 9/10 of $3.85, 1/10 of $0.1   
10 10/10 of $2, 0/10 of $1.6 10/10 of $3.85, 0/10 of $0.1   
Source: Holt and Laury, 2002. 
Another risk elicitation method found in the literature is the one proposed by Gneezy and 
Potters (1997), which provides a measure of risk preferences in the context of financial decision 
making with real monetary payoffs. In this approach, a decision maker receives a certain 
amount of money and is asked to choose how much of it she wishes to invest in a risky option 
and how much to keep. The amount invested has a positive expected return. The subject keeps 
the amount of money not invested (see Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Haigh and List, 2005; 
Apicella et al., 2008; Charness and Gneezy, 2012). This method is relatively simple and can 
be implemented with one trial and basic experimental tools. Results from rural Senegal were 
in line with previous studies in developed countries (Charness and Viceisza, 2016). However, 
this method is not able to differentiate between risk neutral and risk loving individuals. Eckel 
and Grossman (2002) also developed explicitly a simple elicitation technique to elicit risk 
preferences that produced low heterogeneity in choices. In this method, participants were 
presented with a number of gambles and were asked to choose the one that they would like to 
play (see Table 2). The number of gambles presented to subjects vary (see Eckel and Grossman, 
2008; Dave et al., 2010; Reynaud and Couture, 2012). The method is relatively easy for 
individuals to understand. However, it also cannot differentiate between different degrees of 
risk-seeking behaviour.  
This paper would use a choice-based elicitation method developed by Crosetto and Filippin 
(2013) known as the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET). This task asks subjects to decide at 
which point to stop collecting a series of 100 boxes of which one contains a time bomb from a 
minefield. In other words, out of these 100 boxes are 99 empty boxes, which contains actual 
money, and one box, which contains a time bomb programmed to explode at the end of the 
task after all choices have been made. In particular, participants are asked to choose a number 
	 8	
k Î [0, 100] that corresponds to the number of boxes they want to collect from the minefield, 
starting from the first box. Earnings to the participants increase linearly with the number of 
boxes collected (𝑘). After all choices have been made, participants would then be asked to pick 
a number b Î [1, 100] from an urn that represents the position of the time bomb. If 𝑏 ≤ 	𝑘", it 
means that participant 𝑖 collected the bomb which explodes and wipes out his/her entire 
earnings. However, if 𝑏	 > 	𝑘", then participant 𝑖 leaves the minefield without the bomb and 
leaves with g dollars cent for every box collected.  
Table 2: Different gamble choices with alternative framing by Eckel and Grossman. 
Gamble Choice Event Probability (%) Loss Framing ($) No-Loss Framing ($) 
1 A 50 10 16 
B 50 10 16 
2 A 50 18 24 
B 50 6 12 
3 A 50 26 32 
B 50 2 8 
4 A 50 34 40 
B 50 -2 4 
5 A 50 42 48 
B 50 -6 0 
Source: Eckel and Grossman, 2002. 
Decisions by participants can be formalised as the choice of their favourite among the lotteries 
which summarise the trade-off between the amount of money that can be earned and the 
likelihood of obtaining it. The task amounts to choosing the preferred option among 101 
lotteries which is fully described both in terms of probabilities and outcomes by a single 
parameter 𝑘	Î	[0, 100]. 
𝐿 = 0 D//𝛾𝑘 D//LD//                                                                                                                             (2) 
The expected value of these lotteries equals to g	(𝑘	– 	0.01𝑘B), which is a bow-shaped function 
with a maximum at 𝑘	 = 	50 and trivially equal to zero for 𝑘	 = 	0 and 𝑘	 = 	100. If we 
normalise 𝑢 0 = 0, an individual who maximises his expected utility is expected to choose:  
𝑘∗ :	 {(){() = 100 − 𝑘                                                                                                                     (3) 
Assuming the classic constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function 𝑢(𝑥) 	= 	 𝑥: 
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𝑘∗ = 100 D                                                                                                                               (4) 
This implies that a risk neutral subject would choose k* = 50 and the implied levels of r for 
every possible choice k lies in the interval [0, 68.275] (see Crosetto and Filippin, 2013 
Appendix A). 
The BRET approach was used because it requires low numeracy skills and thus making it more 
useful for our subjects, who are rural farmers and mostly not formally educated, than other 
elicitation approaches like the MPL. The BREt also allows for the precise estimation of both 
risk aversion and risk seeking and thus generating a virtually continuous distribution of 
outcomes. Thus, the BRET is also more suitable for our subjects than both Gneezy and Potters 
(1997) and Eckel and Grossman (2002) approaches. Unlike other well-known elicitation 
approaches in the literature, BRET does not suffer from loss aversion as a potential 
confounding factor because it is entirely defined in a gain domain and does not even provide 
endogenous reference points against which some outcomes could be perceived as losses 
(Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). It can be performed even with paper and pencil and thus making 
it possible to be used in a field experiment. In section 3, I will present a version of the task 
which has been used to elicit preferences of 5 year olds children. This is because it is much 
simpler to understand considering the high illiteracy rate of our sample. 
2.2 Loss Aversion 
Traditionally, utility measurement has assumed that people behave according to expected 
utility. However, evidence abounds that people violate expected utility in systematic ways 
(Starmer, 2000) and that utility measurements based on expected utility give inconsistent 
results (Hershey and Schoemaker, 1985; Bleichrodt et al., 2001; Abdellaoui et al., 2007). It is 
also argued that there are two important causes of the violation of expected utility theory. They 
are the probability weighting, which is the nonlinear evaluation of probabilities, and the 
concept of loss aversion, which involves the finding that people evaluate outcomes as gains 
and losses relative to a reference point and are more sensitive to losses than to gains 
(Abdellaoui et al., 2008). Several studies have different definition for loss aversion. According 
to Kahneman and Tversky (1979), in the concept of loss aversion, a prospect of a loss tends to 
loom larger than that of a gain of the same magnitude, i.e. 𝑢(𝑥) 	< 	−𝑢(𝑥) for all 𝑥	 > 	0. This 
implies that a loss aversion coefficient can be defined as the mean or median of −{(L}){(})  over 
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relevant x. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) also, implicitly used −{(LD){(D)  as an index for loss 
aversion. In their work, Fishburn and Kochenberger (1979) used a stronger definition of loss 
aversion that required that u| x ≤ u| −x  for all 𝑥	 > 	0 and indicating that the slope of the 
utility function at each loss is at least as large as the slope of the utility function at the absolutely 
commensurate gain. This definition could be related to a loss aversion coefficient of the mean 
or median of 	{|(L}){|(}) . Other definitions are being proposed by Bowman et al. (1999); Neilson 
(2002); Schmidt and Zank (2005). 
Loss aversion parameters of subjects have been elicited by using lottery games which include 
negative amount in some choices. In most of these games, subjects typically choose relatively 
safer options when faced with possible losses than in gains only games (Wik et al., 2004; Yesuf, 
2009; Tanaka et al. 2010; Liebenehm and Waibel, 2014). For instance, the results of Yesuf 
(2009) show that, for the same expected gain, the proportion of subjects preferring the sure 
income to the gamble doubled when the lower payoff in the gamble changed from a positive 
amount to a negative amount. The degree of loss aversion has been estimated using the value 
function where u x = 𝑥 for all 𝑥	 > 	0 and u x = −l(−𝑥) for all x < 0. Loss aversion has 
also been estimated in both developed and developing countries. Tanaka et al. (2010) and 
Nguyen and Leung, 2010 estimated the average loss aversion of Vietnamese subjects to be 2.63 
and 2.05 respectively. These two estimates in developing countries are closer to the 2.25 
estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) for US university students. This suggests that the 
degrees of loss aversion are similar in developing and developed countries. However, the result 
from Liebenehm and Waibel (2014) indicates that, cattle farmers in West Africa have low loss 
aversion compared to the results from developing countries in Asia. 
This study attempts to measure loss aversion of individuals using a set of ten paired lottery 
choices similar to Morrison and Oxoby (2014). Several studies attempt to measure loss 
aversion with hypothetical choices, which has been suggested by several studies to report 
unreliable proxies for choices affecting real payoffs (see Holt and Laury, 2002). Other studies 
have also attempted to measure loss aversion by using the difference between the amount 
individuals are willing to pay for an object versus the amount that they would accept as 
payment for that object. One major critique of this method is the sensitivity of the object being 
used, and the interference of the different perspectives of an individual engaged in buying 
behaviour from one engaged in selling behaviour. The method used in this study is simple has 
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an advantage of eliciting responses to gambles involving monetary losses, rather than 
hypothetical scenarios.  
2.3 Time Preference 
The concept of discount rate, which is the rate at which individuals substitute future 
consumption with current consumption has been used to measure the time preference of 
individuals. This discount rate is measured by comparing the choice of rewards between two 
time periods, current or future. Suppose an individual’s time preferences over monetary 
rewards and time pairs is given by (𝑥, 𝑡), which is interpreted as x dollars of money obtained at 
time t, or equivalently, t periods from the time of the experiment (e.g., days, weeks, months, 
years). Suppose the individuals’ preference over monetary payoff is assumed to be linear, then 
the discount function, 𝐷(𝑥, 𝑡) is defined so that the individual is indifferent between the pair 
(𝑥, 𝑡) and the pair (𝑥𝐷(𝑥, 𝑡),0) (Benhabib et al., 2010). In effect, it is sufficed to say that the 
value of x at time t is 𝑥𝐷(𝑥, 𝑡). The discount factor is allowed to depend on the amount of 
money to be discounted, x, in this case as well as the delay t. 
One major concern in the literature of time preferences is the nature and shape of the discount 
function 𝐷(𝑥, 𝑡). Classical forms of discounting functions considered in the literature are the 
exponential discounting function, which is defined as: 𝐷 𝑥, 𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 −𝑟𝑡 , 𝑟 > 0                                                                                                        (5) 
where 𝑡 is the delayed time at which x is received. Another form discounting is the hyperbolic 
discounting defined as:                                              
 𝐷 𝑥, 𝑡 = DDL# , 𝑟 > 0                                                                                                               (6) 
Both the hyperbolic and exponential discounting are independent of the amount to be 
discounted, x. However, in contrast to exponential discounting, which is the economically 
normative model with constant discount rate, preferences that display hyperbolic discounting 
induce declining subjective interest rates. In particular, while the subjective discount rate, 
which is defined in general as | A },# },# |, associated with exponential discounting is 𝑟, a 
constant, the subjective interest rate associated with hyperbolic discounting is DL#, which is 
declining in the delay t. It has been observed in most studies (Frederick et al., 2002; Green et 
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al., 1997; Laibson et al., 1997) that, decision makers’ behaviour is not consistent with 
exponential discounting. Another form of a discounting function is the quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting, which refers to the fact that the valuation of rewards declines more sharply for the 
future rewards than those in the more distant future (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 
1999; Benhabib et al., 2010). This specification expands exponential discounting in a way that 
it is adequate to reproduce the reversal of preferences (Benhabib et al., 2010). 
The basic experimental design for eliciting individual discount rates was introduced Coller and 
Williams (1999) and expanded by Harrison et al. (2002). This elicitation format takes the form 
of the multiple price list in the case of eliciting risk preferences which has been criticised to 
have low level of understanding among rural households by Charness and Viceisza (2016). In 
this study, I will use a simple task that presents to participants a series of five choices in 
between two options with a smaller reward delivered an hour after the experiment and a larger 
reward delivered at a specified time. This task has an advantage of reducing the distrust of 
participants in paying the future reward since the current reward is paid an hour after the 
experiment. Also, this task is easy to understand compared with the multiple price list task of 
Harrison et al. (2002) and thus can induce sensible and meaningful responses. 
2.4 Public Good 
Public goods are goods that are collectively consumed or produced and are generally defined 
by two well-known properties of non-excludability, which implies that individuals cannot be 
excluded from the consumption of the good irrespective of their contribution to its production, 
and non-rivalry, which also implies that one individual’s consumption does not reduce the 
amount available to others. Individual members of a group have to decide on whether to 
contribute to the avoidance of a bad or the provision of a good from which all benefits accrue 
to everyone regardless of whether the individual contributed or not. In effect, some individuals 
tend to free ride on others contributions by attempting to enjoy the good without contributing.  
Even though there is a remarkable diversity of public goods experiments in behavioural 
economics, a standard one where a group of n individuals (usually between four and ten or 
even more) are brought together in an experimental lab or together in a field, with each 
individual given a certain amount of money as endowments (𝑧"), which he/she has to decide 
between a part, 𝑥", that he/she keeps to him/herself, and another part, 𝑐" = 𝑧" − 𝑥", which is 
invested in the production of the public good has been used. The total contribution, 𝐶 =
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𝑐"Q"RD , is then used to produce a public good. The individual payoff usually depends on the 
amount the individuals keeps for his/herself and the total contributions, C, which is usually 
doubled and shared equally among all the individuals in the group. This experimental task has 
usually been played repeatedly by same individuals to explore the behaviour of the individuals 
(Adreoni, 1988; Isaac et al., 1985). 
Public good experiments have been used extensively in behavioural economics over the past 
25 years and one robust result is that a large majority of individuals voluntarily cooperate even 
though the Nash equilibrium is to contribute nothing to the public good (Teyssier, 2012; 
Anderson 2001; Ledyard, 1995). Individuals’ behaviour in public good experiments has 
implications for a wide range of economic situations including producers and consumers’ 
decision regarding the protection of the environment, the choices of both medical practitioners 
and patients over health insurance, politicians faced with social dilemmas and the policy 
markers provision of a common good. Individuals contribution in a public good experiment 
can also serve as a form of insurance for the individuals.  
More recent studies have indicated that there is a correlation between individuals’ risk 
preferences and their contributions in a public good experiment. In particular, it has been shown 
that risk aversion reduces individuals’ contributions in public good experiments (Heinemann 
et al., 2009; Schechter, 2007; Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004). Other studies have also indicated 
that subjects who invested more in a risky asset contributed less to a public good (Charness 
and Villeval, 2009; Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, 2002). However, in these studies, the risk 
preferences of respondents were elicited as well as their contributions in a public good 
experiment and correlations were drawn, which may result in spurious results. In this study, I 
test how different degree of exposure to risk impact on the individuals’ contributions in a public 
good experiment. This study, thus, contributes to the literature by investigating how different 
degree of exposure to risk of natural shocks affects cooperation of rural farmers in a field 
experiment that is fully incentivised.  
3. Design of the Experiment 
Experimental design is the process of planning a study to meet specified objectives. Planning 
an experiment properly is very important in order to ensure that the right type of data and a 
sufficient sample size and power are available to answer the research questions of interest as 
clearly and efficiently as possible. In this study, our main goal in designing the experiment was 
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to find different groups that are similar in all domains except for their exposure to risk. In 
effect, the productivity of crops by districts for the whole country was analysed. In particular, 
the productivity of eleven crops produced in the country were considered. To be able to 
compare the productivity of crops produced in each district, the value of productivity, which is 
measured by the product price and crop yield was computed. The first idea was to pick up two 
or more districts in different agro-ecological zones with similar mean value of productivity but 
differ in terms of the variation in the value of productivity.  
The East Nzema district, which is in the southern part of the country and lie in the deciduous 
forest agro-ecological zone and the Tolon-Kumbungu district, which is in the northern part of 
the country and lies in the Guinea savanna agro-ecological zone were ideal for the experiment 
(see Appendix A). However, a careful study of the two districts in terms of culture and other 
socioeconomic characteristics showed that, there are confounding factors in the two districts. 
For instance, while over 90% of the population in the East Nzema district are Christians, over 
90% of the population in the Tolon-Kumbungu district are Muslims. Also, the population in 
the East Nzema district follow a matrilineal system of inheritance, while the population in the 
Tolon-Kumbungu district follows a patrilineal system of inheritance. 
We, therefore, decided to focus on the northern part of the country, which is more rural than 
the south and where people rely heavily on agriculture for their survival. Moreover, 
precipitation patterns in this part of the country are not easily predicted with years of drought 
being followed closely by years of flooding, with flood being very destructive to crops leaving 
households in the wake of famine. In 1999 and then again in 2007, the northern region of 
country was devastated by flooding. For example, the flooding in the year 2007 was preceded 
by months of drought with the growing months of June and July being dry so that when the 
rain finally arrived in August, it resulted in, ephemeral streams instead of percolation into the 
soil3. This delay in rain and the heavy onset of rain washed away healthy crops and also caused 
a loss to those who planted too early. Initial assessment of the losses estimated by the Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture indicates that about 70500 hectares of farmlands were affected4, 
resulting in an estimated loss of 144000 metric tonnes of food crops, which includes maize, 
rice, millet, sorghum, yam, cassava and groundnuts. Additionally, the floods caused severe 
damage including the loss of livestock, the destruction of farmlands, houses, bridges, schools 
																																																						
3	https://www.crwr.utexas.edu/gis/gishydro08/Introduction/TermProjects/Alfredo.htm		
4	http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/tc/tce/pdf/Flash_Ghana_2007.pdf	
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and health facilities as well as damage to the water supply, food storage and processing 
facilities, irrigation systems and loss of lives of 20 people (Armah et al., 2011). 
There has also being an increase in the occurrence of flood in the northern part of the country 
in recent times. In 2012, floods destroyed a total of 1725 farmlands in the northern region alone 
while temporary displacing about 3152 persons in the region5. In all, approximately 22008 
people were affected by the flood resulting in the death of 3 persons. Floods in 2015 also 
resulted in the death of 3 people. These examples show how extreme precipitation has have 
devastating impacts on the livelihoods of households in the northern part of the country. The 
Tolon-Kumbungu district has been chosen for the experiment because according to the 
National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO), the district is flood prone zone. Flood 
has occurred in this area during the months of July to September in 1995, 1997, 2004, 2007, 
2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012. The worst flood in recent times occurred in August 2007, which 
resulted in the loss of 6 human lives, loss of property and temporary rendering more than 1300 
households homeless. Again, over 3000 hectares of farmlands were destroyed in this district 
with many buildings submerged. Further, the floods also caused outbreak of water-borne 
diseases including diarrhoea, cholera and malaria, particularly among children (Musah and 
Oloruntoba, 2013).  
The idea is to exploit a natural experiment implied by different exposure to risk in terms of 
flood and the effects these risks have on the behavioural traits of farmers and their decision-
making process in adopting adaptation strategies. In effect, communities that are highly prone 
to flood and are known to suffer high losses are considered as the treated group, while the least 
susceptible to flood communities are considered as the control group. Out of the 22 flood prone 
communities identified in the Tolon-Kumbungu districts, 5 communities (Kuli, Sheegbuni, 
Nawumi Afayili, and Tampia No. 1 and 2) were selected as our treated group. These 
communities were purposely selected based on their proximity to the river and easy access to 
the communities. A total of 5 communities (Wantugu, Gummon, Koblimahigu, Tali and 
Sabiegu), which are least susceptible to flood were also selected as control groups (see Figure 
1; blue dots represent treatments and red dots represent control groups).  
																																																						
5		https://www.modernghana.com/news/419147/floods-kill-three-affect-22008-people-in-northern-upper-
e.html	
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Figure 1: Study Area 
3.1 Experimental Design 
The experiment consists of four different tasks (risk preferences task, loss aversion task, time 
preference task and a public good task). A total of 10 experimental sessions were organised in 
10 different communities, which consists of 5 treated communities and 5 control communities. 
A total of 20 participants were used for each experimental session in each location, with each 
session lasting about three and half hours. In order to reduce heterogeneity and confounds, 
participants in each community were randomly selected from only male Muslim farmers who 
predominantly cultivate maize and cassava. Also, to reduce the problems cause by internal 
mobility of the population, which will lead to the problem associated with self-selection, 
farmers who have stayed in the communities for more than 20 years were selected for the 
experiment. In addition, an exit questionnaire was administered in a face-to-face interview 
format to obtain the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents and their willingness to 
invest in their farms. We also elicited farmer’s willingness to pay for crop insurance and 
willingness to access credit. In all, a total of 200 participants were used for the experiment. The 
experimental tasks used to for the experiments are discussed below. 
3.1.1 Risk Preferences 
As indicated earlier, the new and improved version of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (BRET) 
which has also been used to elicit risk preferences of 5 year olds was adopted. Participants 
were asked to imagine to be in a minefield, and on a winding road as shown in Figure 2. 
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Participants were also made to understand that exactly 1 bomb is hidden behind one of the 100 
numbers and that they gain ¢0.506 for every step they take. They are to start at step 1, then 2, 
3 and so on. Participants are to indicate every step they take by writing a cross over the number, 
and they are to continue until they reach the step where they want to stop. They also have to 
write the number of steps that they finally decide to take in the box below Figure 2 on their 
left.  
         Start here 
 
1          
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
         12 
22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 
23          
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
         34 
44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 
45          
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 
         56 
66 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 
67          
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 
         78 
88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 
89          
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
         100 
            
                Number of steps:                  Bomb Location: 
 
 
                 
Figure 2: Picture Card for Risk Experiment 
 
 
																																																						
6 Exchange rate the time of the experiment was ¢1= $0.225 
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The participants were also made to understand that, none of us (the experimenter and the 
assistants), including the participants knows the bomb’s location. However, all of us know that 
it is equally likely to be behind any of the 100 steps on the winding road. Therefore, they were 
made to understand that after each participant have decided on the number of steps they will 
take by writing a cross on each step, the location of the bomb for each participant will be 
determined by the participant blindly drawing from a bowl containing 100 number and folded 
papers. The number drawn determined the location of the bomb for that particular participant. 
If the number drawn from the bowl (which is the bomb location) is greater than the number of 
steps the participant decided to take, then it implies that the participant did not step on the bomb 
and earn ¢0.50 for each step he took. 
On the other hand, if the number drawn from the bowl is less than or equal to the number of 
steps the participant took, then that particular participant did step on the bomb and so loses all 
his money; it means he leaves with nothing. The implication is that, the more steps a participant 
decides to take on the minefield, the more money he can make, but the risk that he will step on 
the bomb is also higher. The total number of steps taken would, thus, be used to capture the 
risk preference of respondents. The lower the number of steps taken in the minefield by an 
individual, the more risk averse is that individual. In particular, a respondent who take 10 steps 
in the minefield is more risk averse compared to another individual who takes 15 steps in the 
minefield. 
3.1.2 Loss Aversion 
In the loss aversion task, respondents were given a sheet of paper worth ¢107 before the start 
of the task. The task was constructed as a set of 10 decisions between two options, where they 
have the chance to choose whether they want to keep the ¢10 given to them before the start of 
the task (option A) or to play a lottery (option B). With option B, respondents always have a 
50-50 chance of earning additional ¢10 or lose something and this loss is increasing from row 
1 to 10 (see Table 3). The more loss averse individual will switch sooner from option B to 
option A. In other words, the switching point from B to A is negatively correlated with loss 
aversion. Monotonic switching was induced in the sense that if a participant chooses option A 
in the first decision point (first row), then they cannot switch to option B in any of the 
subsequent decision points.  
																																																						
7	Exchange rate the time of the experiment was ¢1= $0.225 
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Also, participants were made to understand that, the moment they switch from option B to 
option A, they cannot switch back to option B at any point in the subsequent decision points. 
After the completion of all 10 choices by all the participants, one of the participant was asked 
to blindly draw one folded paper out of 10 numbered and folded papers in a bowl. The number 
drawn determined the decision point that all participants will be paid according to the 
respective choices they made if this task is selected for payment. This task may be influenced 
by the individuals’ risk preferences. In effect, I will test to find out whether individuals 
responses in this task are influenced by risk preferences by means of a regression. 
 Table 3: Loss Aversion Task 
Decision OPTION A OPTION B 
1 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢1 
2 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢2 
3 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢3 
4 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢4 
5 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢5 
6 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢6 
7 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢7 
8 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢8 
9 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢9 
10 ¢10 50% chance of +¢10 and a 50% chance of -¢10 
 
3.1.3 Time Preferences 
The time experiment was constructed as two series of 20 choices each, between two options, 
which comprises of a smaller reward delivered an hour after the experiment (option A) and 
larger increasing rewards delivered at a later specified time (Option B). The first series of the 
experimental task is illustrated by the first 20 decision points and the second series is illustrated 
by the last 20 decision points in Table 4. In each decision point on the first series, the same 
amount of ¢58 is earned by the participant an hour9 after the experiment and the delayed reward 
is changed using a subjective interest rate of a multiple of 365% in each block, which 
																																																						
8 Exchange rate the time of the experiment was ¢1= $0.225 
9 This is used to reduce the possibility of respondents choosing the current amount because of distrust in the 
experimenter in paying the future rewards.	
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corresponds to a particular future time. Therefore, each block in the first series (I, II, III, IV) 
corresponds to payment in a particular future time period, with the first block representing 24 
hours, the second representing one week and so on. It is also worth noting that the interest rate 
in each block are similar, with the interest rate of 365% in the 1st decision point being the same 
as the interest rate of the 6th, 11th and the 16th decision points. Also, the interest rate of 730% 
for the 2nd decision point is the same as the interest rate of the 7th, 12th and 17th decision point.  
Choosing option A in each of the decision point in the first series implies that, the participant 
will rather prefer being given ¢5 an hour after the experiment to a delayed payment of a higher 
amount of money in a specific time period. A monotonic switching was induced in this task at 
every block, in the sense that as soon as respondents shift from option A to B in a decision 
block, they cannot shift back to option A in that block because there is no incentive to do so. 
Participants’ switching point in each block was used to compute his subjective interest rate for 
that time period. For instance, if in block I, a participant switched from option A to option B 
on the third decision point, it implies that the participants’ subjective interest rate for one day 
lies between 730% and 1095%. Further, if a participant switched from option A to option B at 
the fourth decision point in block I, then that participants subjective interest rate for one day 
lies between 1095% and 1825%. The higher the subjective interest rate, the more impatient the 
participant. Therefore, by switching from option A to option B, I can test the degree of 
impatience of the participants, with the more impatient subjects switching later from A to B at 
each block. In other words, the earlier the individual shifts from option A to option B in each 
block, the more patient is that individual.  
In order to investigate whether presenting respondents with higher amount of current reward 
changes their discounting for the future compared to lower current amount, a similar task was 
performed with the current amount being ¢10. Similar interest rates were used to compute the 
corresponding future rewards in each block, which also corresponds to the future time period. 
The future time period varies between 24 hours and 3 months, with 3 months corresponding to 
the maximum amount of time it takes to cultivate maize and harvest. After the completion of 
all 40 choices by all the participants, one of the participants was asked to blindly draw one 
folded paper out of 40 numbered and folded papers in a bowl. Respondents decisions at that 
decision point would be paid for if this game is selected for payment.  
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Table 4: Time Experiment Task 
Block Decision Option A Option B   
 
 
I 
1 ¢510 
today ¢5.05 in 1 day 
A B 
2 ¢5 today ¢5.10 in 1 day A B 
3 ¢5 today ¢5.15 in 1 day A B 
4 ¢5 today ¢5.25 in 1 day A B 
5 ¢5 today ¢5.40 in 1 day A B 
 
 
II 
6 ¢5 today ¢5.35 in 1 week A B 
7 ¢5 today ¢5.70 in 1 week A B 
8 ¢5 today ¢6.05 in 1 week A B 
9 ¢5 today ¢6.75 in 1 week A B 
10 ¢5 today ¢7.80 in 1 week A B 
 
 
III 
11 ¢5 today ¢6.50 in 1 month A B 
12 ¢5 today ¢8.00 in 1 month A B 
13 ¢5 today ¢9.50 in 1 month A B 
14 ¢5 today ¢12.50 in 1 month A B 
15 ¢5 today ¢17.00 in 1 month A B 
 
 
IV 
16 ¢5 today ¢9.50 in 3 months A B 
17 ¢5 today ¢14.00 in 3 months A B 
18 ¢5 today ¢18.50 in 3 months A B 
19 ¢5 today ¢27.50 in 3 months A B 
20 ¢5 today ¢41.00 in 3 months A B 
 
 
V 
21 ¢10 today ¢10.10 in 1 day A B 
22 ¢10 today ¢10.20 in 1 day A B 
23 ¢10 today ¢10.30 in 1 day A B 
24 ¢10 today ¢10.50 in 1 day A B 
25 ¢10 today ¢10.80 in 1 day A B 
 
 
VI 
26 ¢10 today ¢10.70 in 1 week A B 
27 ¢10 today ¢11.40 in 1 week A B 
28 ¢10 today ¢12.10 in 1 week A B 
29 ¢10 today ¢13.50 in 1 week A B 
30 ¢10 today ¢15.60 in 1 week A B 
 
 
VII 
31 ¢10 today ¢13.00 in 1 month A B 
32 ¢10 today ¢16.00 in 1 month A B 
33 ¢10 today ¢19.00 in 1 month A B 
34 ¢10 today ¢25.00 in 1 month A B 
35 ¢10 today ¢34.00 in 1 month A B 
 
 
VIII 
36 ¢10 today ¢19.00 in 3 months A B 
37 ¢10 today ¢28.00 in 3 months A B 
38 ¢10 today ¢37.00 in 3 months A B 
39 ¢10 today ¢55.00 in 3 months A B 
40 ¢10 today ¢82.00 in 3 months A B 
																																																						
10 Exchange rate the time of the experiment was ¢1=$0.225 
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Also, to minimise the possibility of a transaction costs associated with waiting when paid in 
the future, both current and future payments would be done through mobile money in case this 
task is selected for payment. 
3.1.4 Public Good Experiment 
Before the start of the experimental task, participants were grouped together, with each group 
containing 4 participants. Each member of the group was then given an envelope, which 
contains a total of 10 toffees, with each toffee worth ¢111 to the participant. Each participant 
then decides individually how many toffees to keep for himself and how many to leave in the 
envelope (which is his contribution to the group). Participants were made to understand that, 
the toffees they keep for themselves are for them alone for which they are not going to share 
with anybody. However, the toffees in the envelope they will put in a box would be doubled 
and the amount will be shared equally between the four of them regardless of whether someone 
contributed or not. This game was played 10 times and total contributions were recorded for 
all the group members to see before the next round of game is performed. I also explained to 
the participants that after the experiment, one of them will draw a number from 1 to 10 with 1 
representing the first round of games and 2 representing the second round of games and so on. 
What a participant earns on that particular session will be the one I will pay for if that 
experiment is selected to be paid for among all the 4 experiments. 
3.1.5 Procedures and summary of earnings 
In addition to all four experimental tasks, an exit survey was administered in a face-to-face 
interview format to obtain the socioeconomic characteristics of the respondents and their 
adoption of adaptation strategies. Each participant was paid a participation fee of ¢10 in 
addition to the real money they won in the course of the experiment, which was on the average 
¢21.23 and equivalent to $4.78. The participation fee was set at ¢10 because the current daily 
minimum wage in Ghana is ¢8.80, which has been increased to ¢9.68 effective from January, 
201812. Therefore, in general, participants were paid an average of 3 days’ minimum wage. I 
only paid for one of the 4 experimental tasks which was selected at random at the end of every 
session by one of the participants in each of the 10 sessions.  
																																																						
11 Exchange rate the time of the experiment was ¢1=$0.225 
12	http://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/july-11th/daily-minimum-wage-goes-up-by-10.php		
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4. Methodology 
To estimate how economic preferences of respondents affect their adoption of adaptation 
strategies, I first investigated the factors that influences farmers’ economic preferences. The 
classical regression model, which is used to quantify the relationship between response variable 
(outcome) and predictor variables (covariates) was used to investigate the factors influencing 
all economic preferences of farmers. This standard regression technique summarises the 
average relationship between a set of covariates (X) and the outcome variable (Y) based on the 
conditional mean function 𝐸(𝑌|𝑋). Also, the correlation between farmers’ economic 
preferences and their decisions on willingness to pay for agricultural crop insurance and 
willingness to contribute to build dams was investigated by means of a standard classical 
regression model. 
However, to investigate the linkage between farmers’ economic preferences and their decisions 
on accessing credit to invest in their farms, I adopted the cumulative distribution function to 
estimate a regression with the measure of economic preferences of subjects and their 
socioeconomic characteristics as explanatory variables. This is because, the dependent variable 
“credit”, which is farmers’ decisions on whether to access a credit facility is equal to 1 if the 
farmer decides to access credit and 0 otherwise. This form of dependent variable is known as 
a limited dependent variable. This form of decision can be modelled by either a logistic 
function or probit function (Woodridge, 2013). The model for estimating a binary dependent 
variable is given by: 𝑦"∗ = 𝑥"|𝛽 + 𝜇"                                                                                                                              (7) 
where 𝑦"∗ is unobserved, which is also referred to as a latent variable. From our data, we can 
assume that a participant chooses to access credit if the utility difference exceeds a certain 
threshold, which can be set to zero. In effect, we observe 𝑦" = 1 if the participant chooses to 
access credit to invest in his farm, that is, if and only if 𝑦"∗ > 0, and 𝑦" = 0 if otherwise. 
Consequently, we have  𝑃 𝑦" = 1 = 𝑃 𝑦"∗ > 0 = 𝑃 𝑥"|𝛽 + 𝜇" > 0 = 𝑃 −𝜇" ≤ 𝑥"|𝛽 = 𝐹(𝑥"|𝛽)                               (8) 
where F denotes the distribution function of −𝜇" and −𝜇" is assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed. The subscript i indicates an individual and 𝑥" is a vector of 
individuals’ economic preferences and other socioeconomic factors, which include the 
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participants’ household income, age, level of education, treatment, dependency ratio and the 
size of respondent’s farm. Equation (7) can be estimated by maximum likelihood method, with 
the likelihood contribution of participant i with 𝑦" = 1 given by 𝑃 𝑦" = 1|𝑥"  as a function of 
the unknown parameter vector 𝛽, and similarly for 𝑦" = 0 (see Verbeek, 2012). Thus, the 
likelihood function of the entire sample is given by:  
𝐿 = 𝑃 𝑦" = 1|𝑥"; 𝛽 M@F"RD 𝑃 𝑦" = 0|𝑥"; 𝛽 DLM@                                                                      (9) 
or  
 𝐿 = 𝐹(𝑥"|𝛽)M@F"RD 𝐹(𝑥"|𝛽)DLM@                                                                                               (9*) 
The log-likelihood function can be obtained by taking natural log of equation (9*) to obtain 
 𝑙𝑛𝐿 = 𝑦"𝑙𝑛F"RD 𝐹 𝑥"|𝛽 +	 (1 − 𝑦")ln	[1 −F"RD 𝐹 𝑥"|𝛽 ]                                                      (10) 
substituting for the appropriate form of F, that is either logistic distribution or normal 
distribution, gives an expression that can be maximised with respect to a in order to obtain 
either a logistic regression or a probit regression estimates. 
5. Results  
I will first analyse the descriptive statistics of participants’ socioeconomic characteristics in 
order to investigate whether the two groups (control and treated) only differ ex ante as a result 
of the degree of their exposure to the risk of flood, and also, identify key variables that would 
be used in the later analysis of economic preferences. I will also present the descriptive analysis 
of the adaptation measures farmers are willing to adopt in order to reduce the impact of natural 
shocks on their households and farms. The real choices of farmers in the experimental tasks 
would also be analysed to investigate whether exposure to risk affects economic preferences. 
In addition, I will present the multivariate analysis investigating the factors that influences 
farmers’ economic preferences and assessing whether these preferences influence their 
decision making on adopting adaptation strategies. 
5.1.1 Results on the socioeconomic characteristics of groups ex-ante 
This section deals with the analysis of socioeconomic characteristics of participants to 
investigate whether the two groups are the similar ex ante. Results on the ex-ante characteristics 
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of the participants are presented in Table 5. Average household size was found to be 6 with a 
minimum of 2 household members and a maximum of 11 household members. The results of 
a Mann-Whitney test show that, there is no significance difference in the average household 
size of the two samples (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.244). There was also no significant difference in the 
number of adults in each household and dependency ratio, which is measured by the ratio of 
household members below the age of 15 to household members above the age of 15 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 >𝑧 = 0.3549). 
The data on education also revealed that majority of the participants (62%) do not have formal 
education, with the remaining 38% having either a basic or secondary education. Comparing 
the education level of participants from the two samples, I found out that, while about 66% of 
the sample in the treated group were illiterates, only 58% of the respondents in the control 
group were illiterates. However, a Fisher exact test indicates that there is no significant 
difference in the fraction of respondents who are illiterates in the treated group and the fraction 
of respondents who are illiterates in the control group (𝑝 = 0.530). It is also important to note 
that, of the 38% of the participants who were formally educated in the whole sample, 
approximately 46% have basic education with the remaining 54% having up to a secondary 
education qualification.  
The average age of respondents was 43.5 years, with the youngest being 27 years and the eldest 
being 64 years old. There was, also, no significant difference in the age of the respondents in 
the two samples, even though the respondents in the control group were slightly older than 
their counterparts in the treatment on the average (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.303). I also found out that, 
there is no significant difference in the number of years respondents have been involved in 
farming in the two groups (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.326), indicating that there are no differences in 
experience in terms of farming. 
On the average, the results show that, farmers cultivate on 4.9 acres of land, which is 
approximately equal to 2 hectares, with maize and cassava being the major crops grown by 
these farmers. This confirms the findings by MOFA (2013) and Choudhary et al. (2015), which 
states that approximately 90 percent of smallholder farmers in Ghana farm on less than two 
hectares of land and they produce a diversity of crops. The average size of farms in the control 
group were slightly higher than the average size of farms in the flood prone areas, although the 
difference is not statistically significant according to a Mann-Whitney test (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 =0.203). 
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Table 5: Socioeconomic characteristics of groups ex-ante 
Variable Control Treated Mann-Whitney Z p-value 
Age 44.17 43.05 
1.030 0.3032 
  (7.58) (8.59) 
Average Household 
Income13 701.61 694.40 0.710 0.4778 
  (93.61) (99.76) 
Household Size 5.96 6.27 
-1.164 0.2443 
  (1.71) (1.84) 
Adult 2.32 2.37 
-0.627 0.5307 
  (0.57) (0.60) 
Farming Years 23.52 22.46 
0.983 0.3255 
  (8.14) (8.28) 
Farm Size 5.07 4.82 
1.273 0.2031 
  (1.44) (1.33) 
Maize Output (100kg bag) 23.25 22.71 
1.229 0.2192 
  (3.15) (3.16) 
Cassava Output (100kg bag) 18.45 17.80 
1.578 0.1146 
  (2.67) (2.00) 
Price of Maize ($ per bag) 25.67 25.47 
0.954 0.3400 
  (0.98) (1.09) 
Price of Cassava ($ per bag) 16.90 16.75 
1.636 0.1018 
  (0.78) (0.84) 
Dependency Ratio14 2.60 2.66 
-0.925 0.3549 
  (0.60) (0.55) 
Education: (Fisher Test)     
     No Education 58% 66% 
 0.530      Basic Education 19% 16% 
     Secondary Education 23% 18% 
Source: Author’s survey, 2017. 
The average maize production by the respondents was about 23 bags, with a minimum 
production of 17 bags and a maximum of 33 bags. Average maize production in the treated 
group was less than average production in the control group by approximately 0.5 bags. 
Statistical test by the Mann-Whitney test (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.3036) shows that there was no 
significance difference in the maize output of the two groups. The results on cassava production 
also show that the average production in the control group is greater than the average cassava 
																																																						
13 Household annual average income is the sum of respondents’ income from crops, off farm income, remittances 
and income of other household members working. The amount is in USD 
14 Dependency ratio is the ratio of total household members to number of household members actively working	
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output in the treated group. However, just like the result on the production of maize, this 
difference in output was also not statistically significant by the Mann-Whitney test (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 >𝑧 = 0.115). 
The results also show that, on the average households sold about 67% of their maize production 
(15.48 bags) on the market at an average price of $25.57 per 100kg bag during the previous 
growing season. On the production of cassava, households produced about 18.13 bags on the 
average and sold approximately 13.2 bags (73%) at an average price of $16.74 per bag. There 
was no significant difference in the average price of both maize and cassava that the two groups 
sold their output, even though the average price is higher for both maize and cassava in the 
control group (see Table 3). 
Annual average total income of respondents’ households ranges from a minimum of $517.95 
to a maximum of $1057.5. On the average, households earn about $698 per annum, with 
households in the control group having higher annual income compared to households in the 
treated group ($701.61 vs $694.4). However, statistical test results show that, there are no 
significance difference in the mean income of households from these two groups. This is 
confirmed by a Mann-Whitney test, which also indicates that there is no significant difference 
in the average income of respondents from the two groups (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.478). Also, a 
Mann-Whitney test on the income from crops shows that there is no statistical difference 
between the two groups (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.102). The results also show that all respondents have 
spent all their lifetime in the communities I ran the experiment, indicating that there was no 
migration between the two groups.   
5.1.2 Results on the outcome of respondents’ exposure to risk 
In this section, I analyse the outcome of the treated and control groups in terms of their 
exposure to risk. The results on the impact of the exposure to the risk of flood on crop 
production indicate that, farmers in the treated group suffered higher losses compared to 
farmers in the control group in the previous growing season (see Table 6). For example, in the 
production of maize, farmers in the treated group lost more than double amount lost in the 
control group on the average. In particular, whereas farmers in the treated group lost about 5.19 
bags of maize in the previous growing season on the average, farmers in the control group lost 
only about 2.39 bags of maize as a result of their exposure to flood risk. A Mann-Whitney test 
showed that there is a statistically significant difference in the amount of maize lost in the 
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previous season by farmers in the treated group and the control group, with the treated group 
losing more maize (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.000).  
The results also show that there is a very strong statistical significant difference in the amount 
of cassava production lost in the treated group and the control group in the previous growing 
period, with the treated group losing more. In particular, the treated group lost about 1.7 bags 
more of cassava output on the average than their counterparts in the control group (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 >𝑧 = 0.000). The value of losses was also computed by the amount of crops the farmers lost 
in the previous growing period and how much they would have earned in the market had they 
not been lost. This was done by multiplying the losses by the price the respondents sold their 
output in the market. The value of these losses ranges from a minimum of $68.06 to a maximum 
of $ 322.88, with an average of about $169.4 in both groups. A Mann-Whitney test indicates 
that, there was a significant difference in the value of losses reported by the two groups 
(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.000), with the treated group having higher losses as a result of their exposure 
to flood. In particular, while the treated group lost about $218.44on the average, farmers in the 
control group were losing only about $120.36 on the average. 
Table 6: Analysis of the outcome of the exposure to risk ex-ante 
Variable Control Treated Mann-Whitney Z p-value 
Maize Loss (Bags) 2.39 5.19 
-12.11 0.000 
  (0.88) (0.87) 
Cassava Loss (Bags) 3.51 5.16 
-10.15 0.000 
  (0.70) (1.05) 
Value of Crop Loss ($) 534.93 970.84 
-12.07 0.000 
  (117.61) (152.65) 
Loss (Last Year vs Last 5 Years):      
    Different  8% 4% 
 0.37315 
    Similar 92% 96% 
Source: Author’s survey, 2017. 
It would have been more appropriate to use the average losses over the last five years for the 
analysis but it was difficult to quantify the losses of the last five with respondents having to 
recall their exact losses. In order to solve this problem, respondents were asked to indicate 
whether flood has been occurring frequently over the last five years and whether the losses 
they reported for the previous year significantly differ from their average losses over the last 
five years. The results also show that, for about 94% of the respondents, their reported losses 
																																																						
15 Fisher Exact test p-value 
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do not differ significantly from their average losses over the last five years. This shows that the 
losses reported by the respondents are not a one-off occurrence and thus can be used as a good 
proxy for the impact of the degree of exposure to risk by the different groups. 
In all, based on the results of analysis in the two previous sections, I can conclude that our two 
groups are similar in terms of their socioeconomic and cultural characteristics ex ante. I can 
also conclude that the two groups differ significantly ex ante as a result of the consequences of 
their exposure to flood risk. In effect, I have two groups that are only different with respect to 
their degree of exposure to a natural shock (flood). Therefore, crucially for a field experiment, 
there is evidence that the design was effective and thus results from the experiment may be 
trusted. 
In order to investigate whether the communities within the treated and the control groups are 
similar in terms of the value of losses and average income, a Kruskal-Wallis test was performed 
on each group (see Table 7). The results show that, there are no significant differences in the 
value of losses within the control group ( 𝜒B = 	2.798; 	𝑝 < 0.592). However, the results 
from the Kruskal-Wallis test within the treated group revealed that there is significant 
difference in losses between the villages ( 𝜒B = 	9.747; 	𝑝 < 0.045).  
Table 7: Kruskal-Wallis test of equality of populations within groups 
Treated  Control 
 Value of Losses  Value of Losses 
Village Mean 
KW 
c2 p-value  Village Mean 
KW 
c2 p-value 
1. Tampia 1 & 2 1059.83 
9.747 0.045 
 6. Wantugu 564.58 
2.798 0.5922 
2. Kuli 959.45  7. Gummon 531.33 
3. Afayili 979.18  8. Tali 524.55 
4. Nawumi 929.95  9. Koblimahigu 549.13 
5. Sheegbuni 925.80  10. Sabiegu 505.08 
 Income   Income 
Village Mean 
KW 
c2 p-value  Village Mean 
KW 
c2 p-value 
1. Tampia 1 & 2 2991.38 
13.31 0.010 
 6. Wantugu 3192.90 
9.013 0.061 
2. Kuli 3248.70  7. Gummon 3107.95 
3. Afayili 2824.60  8. Tali 3308.28 
4. Nawumi 3183.93  9. Koblimahigu 2952.25 
5. Sheegbuni 3182.40  10. Sabiegu 3029.98 
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In effect, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was also used to investigate the particular communities 
that cause the difference in losses in the treated group. The results show that the difference in 
the value losses was caused by the high amount of losses incurred in the Tampia community 
(see Appendix B). The test on the equality of income with groups shows that there is a 
significant difference in income within both the treated and the control groups. 
5.1.3 Results on adaptation measures 
Respondents were also asked to indicate how much they would be willing to sacrifice in 
monetary terms in order to reduce the impact of climate shocks on their households and farms. 
In particular, respondents were asked to indicate the maximum amount they will be willing to 
invest in building a drainage system to reduce the impact of flood on their farms, the maximum 
amount they would be willing to pay for a bag of fertilizer. In all, a dichotomous contingent 
valuation method16 (CVM) with follow up questions, which is used to reduce strategic biases 
in CVM, was used. Finally, I also asked the respondents whether they would be willing to 
access formal financial credit to invest in their farms and also whether they would be willing 
to purchase agricultural insurance. The results on these adaptation measures are presented in 
Table 8. 
Biases might arise at any stage of the CVM design and implementation, which include the 
construction of the hypothetical scenario (Bishop and Heberlein, 1979), development and 
application of the method and elicitation procedure for instance starting point bias in bidding 
games (Boyle et al., 1986; Thayer, 1981). In order to overcome some of the biases involves 
careful survey and pretesting of questionnaires, competent management of the survey and 
enumerators, and the use of range of test and observations of the results during the analysis 
(Wedgewood and Sansom, 2003). For example, one common bias is the starting point biases 
which arises when the initial bid influences the final willingness to pay (WTP) given by the 
respondents. In order to minimise this bias, the initial bid should be varied within the sample 
																																																						
16	The Contingent Valuation method (CVM) is an approach that quantifies the value of an 
environment or society itself by calculating an amount that measures the WTP of local 
residents, or the amount of compensation required to agree to changing or eliminating the 
environment, and by replacing these amounts by pseudo prices. In other words, the CVM 
approach consists of directly asking individuals the value they attach to environmental 
resources and its attributes, and to directly state their preferences towards environmental 
changes. This process estimates the respondents’ consumer surplus for the environmental good, 
and the maximum amount the non-marketed good is worth to the respondent.	
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frame to examine whether they are influencing the final WTP. In effect, five starting bid prices 
were used in eliciting respondent’s willingness to pay for the hypothetical drainage systems. 
These bids were set following the results I obtained from the pilot survey.  
Respondents were asked to respond either yes or no as to whether they would be willing to pay 
the initial bid price for the drainage system. The data revealed that only 7% of the respondents 
said yes to the initial bid price given and gave a higher WTP figure. The rest refused and gave 
a lower bid than the initial bid price. A spearman test of correlation was used to investigate 
whether the final willingness to pay values indicated by the respondents was significantly 
influenced by the initial bid in which case will result in starting point biases. The results show 
that there was no significant correlation between the initial bid and the final WTP values 
(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.200), indicating that the final willingness to pay to invest in drainage systems 
were not influenced by the starting bid prices. On the average, each respondent was willing to 
pay an average of $6.30 per year to build a drainage system to reduce the impact of flood. 
Results from nonparametric statistical test show that, farmers in the treated group were 
significantly willing to contribute more for the construction of drainage systems (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 =0.013). In particular, farmers in the treated group were willing to pay about $7.02 on the 
average per year for a drainage system, while farmers in the control were willing to pay about 
$5.56 on the average per year. 
The highest amount that respondents were willing to pay for a 50kg bag of fertilizer, which can 
help improve crop yield, was also reported by the respondents. Five initial bids, which were 
set following research about the current subsidised price17 of fertilizers in the country, were 
also used to find respondents’ true willingness to pay for a 50kg bag of fertilizer. Just like the 
procedure in eliciting the willingness to pay for a drainage system, respondents were also asked 
to respond either yes or no as to whether they would be willing to pay the initial bid price for 
a 50kg bag of fertilizer. Almost all the respondents (94.5%) said no to the initial price and gave 
a lower bid than the initial price bid, indicating that, respondents perceive the current subsidised 
price of fertilizer to be very high. On the average, respondents are willing to pay $6.13 per 
50kg bag of fertilizer, which is about half the current subsidised price. The results also show 
that farmers in the control group were significantly willing to pay higher for a bag of fertilizer 
																																																						
17 http://citifmonline.com/2017/04/07/govt-slashes-fertilizer-prices-by-50/  
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($6.82) compared to their counterparts in the treated group who were willing to pay $5.31 
(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.000). 
On the respondents’ willingness to buy a crop insurance, I asked the respondents to indicate 
the highest amount they would be willing to pay per annum as insurance premium for their 
farms. The results show that, respondents were willing to pay an average of $8.95 per annum 
for insurance. It was also revealed that, farmers in the control group were only willing to pay 
$8.33 per annum for insurance. Farmers in the treated group, on the other hand, were willing 
to pay much higher premium ($9.58) for crop insurance. The difference in the amount farmers 
in the two groups were willing to pay was statistically highly significant by a Mann-Whitney 
test (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.002). 
Respondents were also asked about whether they will be willing to buy an agricultural 
insurance and whether they will be willing to access credit to invest in their farms. While, all 
the respondents were willing to insure their crops, only 67 respondents, representing about 
33.5% of the sample population were willing to access credit to invest in their farms. Of the 
66.5% of the respondents who were not willing to access credit to invest in their farms, about 
56% were from the treated group, whereas the remaining 44% were from the control group. In 
addition, non-parametric test shows that, there are significant difference between the two 
groups in terms of their willing to access credit for farming (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.011).  
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of adaptation measures 
Variable Control Treated Mann-Whitney Z p-value 
WTP for Drainage System per year ($) 5.57 7.03 
-2.492 0.013 
  (2.38) (3.60) 
WTP for Fertilizer per year ($) 6.72 5.31 
4.735 0.000 
  (2.36) (1.85) 
WTP for Insurance per growing season ($) 8.33 9.58 
-3.117 0.002 
  (2.77) (2.57) 
Willingness to Access Credit:     
                   Yes 42% 25% 
 0.01618 
                    No 58% 75% 
Source: Author’s survey, 2017. 
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5.2 Experimental Results 
In this section, I proceed to analyse the actual choices made by the respondents in our 
experimental tasks in order to investigate whether different degree of exposure to risk have 
significant effects on the economic preferences of individuals. The results of these actual 
choices are presented in Table 9.  
5.2.1 Risk Preferences 
The number of steps the respondents took from the minefield ranges from a minimum of 3 
steps to a maximum of 95 steps. On average, the number of steps respondents took was 24.4, 
indicating a strong degree of risk aversion. This result was not consistent with the study of 
Vieider and L’Haridon (2016) which indicates that subjects in developing countries are 
generally less risk averse. This may be as a result of the fact that both groups are significantly 
exposed to some degree of risk, thereby, making the whole sample in general more risk averse 
confirming the theory of the relationship between background risk and risk preferences 
(Cameron and Shah, 2012). On average, subjects from the control group took about 30.5 steps, 
whereas subjects in the treated took an average of approximately 18.3 steps from the minefield. 
The result of a Mann-Whitney test indicates that, subjects in the control group significantly 
took the highest number of steps on the minefield than their colleagues in the treated group 
(𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.000). Also, Fisher exact test on the fraction of respondents who are risk 
averse in both groups shows that there is a significant difference in the fraction of participants 
who are risk averse in the two groups, with the larger fraction of participants in the treated 
being more risk averse (𝑝	 < 	0.012). In particular, while only about 80% of participants in the 
control group were risk averse, about 92% of the participants in the treated group were risk 
averse. This implies that participants in the treated group are significantly more risk averse in 
general than those in the control group confirming the implication of background risk 
(Cameron and Shah, 2012). 
5.2.2 Loss Aversion 
The results on the loss aversion task revealed that a total of 111 respondents representing about 
55% of the subjects would prefer the safe option of keeping the $2.25 given to them before the 
task (option A) in every decision point with the remaining 45% choosing to play the gamble of 
option B at least once. Out of the 111 respondents who decided to choose the safer option in 
every decision point, 65 respondents representing 59% were from the treated group, while the 
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remaining 46 respondents were from the control group (see Table 9). Further, statistical test 
using the Fisher exact test indicates that there is a significant difference in the fraction of 
participants who decided to choose option A in all decision points in the two groups, with the 
treated group having the highest percentage (𝑝	 < 	0.093). This implies that loss aversion is 
stronger in the treated group. This result is confirmed by a Mann Whitney test, which was used 
to test the equality of the average switching point of the two groups (|𝑧| = 2.906, 𝑝 < 0.004). 
In particular, the results show that there is a significant difference in the average switching 
point of the two groups, with the treated group having the lowest average switching point, 
indicating that the treated group are more loss averse compared to the control group.  
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of experimental tasks results 
Variable Control Treated Mann-Whitney Z p-value 
Risk Aversion (Number of Steps) 30.47 18.26 
5.764 0.000 
  (20.46) (18.42) 
Loss Aversion (Switching Point from B to A):   
 0.09319 
     Zero20 46% 65% 
    One  12% 9% 
    Two 13% 9% 
    Three 7% 8% 
     Four 10% 6% 
     Five 8% 2% 
     Six 4% 1% 
Loss Aversion (Average Switching Point) 1.63 0.91 
2.906 
0.004 
 (1.92) (1.48)  
Time Preferences (Subjective Discount Rate, ¢5) 3644.57 3990.13 
-3.185 0.001 
  (935.8) (781.63) 
Time Preferences (Subjective Discount Rate, ¢10) 3243.85 3729.48 
-3.253 0.001 
 (1180.89) (1057.32) 
Public Good21 (Average Group Contribution) 3.38 4.20 
-4.921 0.000 
  (0.36) (0.52) 
Source: Author’s survey, 2017. 
In order to investigate whether the responses in the loss aversion task was influenced by 
respondents’ degree of risk aversion, a regression was run on the switching point of 
respondents with the number of steps (risk aversion) as explanatory variable. Also, the 
																																																						
19 Fisher Exact test p-value 
20 Zero represents respondents who chose option A in every decision point	
21 Whereas all the other variables have 200 observations, this variable has 50 observations because the 
respondents were grouped into groups of 4.	
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treatment group was used as an explanatory variable to investigate whether the degree of 
exposure has a significant effect of respondents’ switching point after controlling for risk 
aversion. The results from the regression revealed that, there is a statistical significant positive 
relationship between the switching point and respondents' number of steps taken by the 
respondents in the risk preference task, indicating that the choices in discussion were 
influenced by risk aversion (see Table 10).  
Table 10: Relationship between loss aversion and risk aversion 
Variables Loss Aversion (Switching Point) 
Risk Aversion (Number of Steps) 0.078*** 
  (0.004) 
Treated 0.234* 
  (0.123) 
Constant -0.750*** 
  (0.125) 
Observations 200 
R-squared 0.796 
                    10000 Bootstrap Standard Errors in parenthesis 
                            ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
In particular, the results show that respondents who are more risk averse are also more loss 
averse. Surprisingly, after controlling for risk aversion, there is evidence of loss aversion being 
weaker in the treated group than in the control group, indicating that different degree of 
exposure to risk makes people less loss averse. In effect, I can argue that, different degree of 
exposure to risk does not have a conclusive outcome on respondents’ loss aversion. 
5.2.3 Time Preferences 
In the time preference task, participants were asked to indicate whether they will like to keep 
the same amount of money at all times or a delayed future reward to be received in a future 
date. Two series of games comprising of subjective discount rate but different amount for the 
current payment was used, with the lower current payoff of $1.13 and a higher current payoff 
of $2.25. The goal was to assess whether presenting respondents with higher amount of current 
reward changes their discounting for the future. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that 
respondents’ subjective average interest rate tends to be much higher when faced with lower 
current amount ($1.13) than when faced with higher current amount ($2.25) (|𝑧| = 9.31, 𝑝 <0.000). This is consistent with what is found in the literature, which indicate that subjective 
interest rate is lower for larger amounts (Ikeda, 2016). In effect, the results of the two series, 
	 36	
which comprises of low current amount of $1.13 and high current amount of $2.25 cannot be 
collapsed together because there are significant differences in the subjective interest rate for 
the two rewards in all the future time period, except for one day (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Subjective interest rate of participants with different amount of money. 
I, therefore, proceeded to analyse the responses with the lower and higher current rewards 
separately by the treatment to investigate whether different degree of exposure to risk has 
significant impact on the subjective interest rate of respondents. A Mann-Whitney test of 
equality shows that subjective interest rate is significantly higher for the treated group (|𝑧| =3.19, 𝑝 < 0.001 for lower current reward of $1.13 and |𝑧| = 3.25, 𝑝 < 0.001 for higher 
current reward of $2.25) (see Table 9), indicating that the treated group are more impatient (see 
Figure 4 a and b). This evidence shows that higher degree of exposure to risk that cannot be 
avoided makes people more impatient. Similar results were found by Ali Bchr and Willinger 
(2013), which reported that poor households in villages exposed to volcanic threats in Peru are 
more impatient. The pattern of the results is also continuous when breaking down by periods. 
It is also important to note that the subjective interest rate exhibit a decreasing trend, which is 
an indication that the subjective interest rate is not constant. This is an evidence against 
exponential discounting, which states that subjective interest rates are constant over time, but 
evidence for hyperbolic discounting, which indicates that subjective interest rates are 
decreasing. This result was further investigated by a means of a regression controlling for 
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treatment effect. The results indicate a strong evidence for hyperbolic discounting, with the 
treated group having a higher subjective discount rate but less prone to hyperbolic discounting 
(see Table 11). 
 
Figure 4a: Subjective interest rate of participants with lower current reward by location 
 
 
Figure 4b: Subjective interest rate of participants with higher current reward by location 
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Table 11: Test of Hyperbolic Subjective Interest Rate 
Variable Time (¢5) Time (¢5) Time (¢10) Time (¢10) 
Trend -31.26*** -39.85*** -50.07*** -64.98*** 
 (4.38) (6.65) (5.30) (7.81) 
Trend Square 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.36*** 0.46*** 
 (0.039) (0.062) (0.046) (0.07) 
Trend*Treated  17.17**  29.81*** 
  (8.74)  (10.16) 
Trend sq. * Treated  -0.094  -0.225** 
  (0.079)  (0.09) 
Observation 800 800 800 800 
R-squared 0.265 0.292 0.339 0.363 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
5.2.4 Public Good 
The results from the public good task also indicates that, participants are willing to contribute 
an average of 3.8 out of their total of 10 endowments for a common purpose. On average, the 
25 groups in the treated group contributed more per group than the 25 groups in the control 
group. In particular, while the average contribution in the treated group was 4.2 units, the 
average group contribution in the control group was 3.4 units (see Table 9). A man Whitney 
test of the group contributions shows that, the average contributions in the treated group was 
significantly higher than the average contributions in the control group (|𝑧| = 5.20, 𝑝 <0.000). This result was also true when I analyse the average contribution by period as shown 
by Figure 5. The results show that contributions decay after successive rounds of games 
indicating that free riding was dominant over time (see Figure 5), which is consistent with the 
results of Isaac et el. (1985) and Andreoni (1988). 
As indicated early, previous studies have shown that there is a correlation between risk aversion 
and cooperation in both positive (Heinemann et al. 2009; Schechter 2007; Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser 2004) and negative (Charness and Villeval, 2009; Sabater-Grande and 
Georgantzis, 2002) direction. However, these studies just investigated the relationship between 
elicited risk aversion of respondents and their contributions in a public good experiment. In 
this study, I investigated the effects of the different degree of exposure to risk on participants’ 
level of cooperation and the results show that participants who have experienced higher degree 
of exposure to risk are more cooperative.  
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Figure 5: Average group contributions by location. 
In order to investigate whether there is a relationship between cooperation and the risk 
preferences of respondents, a regression was run on the average contributions of respondents 
with the number of steps (risk aversion) as explanatory variable. Also, the treatment group was 
used as an explanatory variable to investigate whether the degree of exposure has a significant 
effect of respondents’ average contribution after controlling for risk aversion. The results show 
that there is a strong positive relationship between cooperation and risk aversion behaviour. 
This confirms the results of Heinemann et al. 2009; Schechter, 2007; and Bohnet and 
Zeckhauser, 2004, who reported that risk averse individuals are more cooperative. Also, even 
after controlling for risk aversion, there was still evidence of cooperation being strong in the 
treated group than in the control group, indicating that higher degree of exposure to risk makes 
people more cooperative (see Table 12). Therefore, it is not just risk aversion, exposure to risk 
makes people more cooperative on top of more risk averse. This implies that respondents 
perceive cooperation as a form of insurance against the impact of the exposed risk on their 
households and farms. This is a very import result because, it is the first study that investigates 
the link between individuals' exposure to risk and cooperation and shows a significant 
relationship between exposure to risk and cooperation. 
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Table 12: Relationship between cooperation and risk aversion 
Variables Average Contribution 
Risk Aversion (Number of Steps) -0.011*** 
  (0.002) 
Treated 0.674*** 
  (0.075) 
Constant 3.727*** 
  (0.070) 
Observations 200 
R-squared 0.426 
                    10000 Bootstrap Standard Errors in parenthesis 
                            ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis 
As indicated earlier, in addition to the descriptive analysis, an econometric analysis may 
provide better information and clearer focus on the factors that influences farmers’ preferences 
and their adaptation measures and also help us to derive policy recommendations. The general 
approach of this technique was to investigate the relationship between farmers’ economic 
preferences and their socioeconomic characteristics. The treatment was included in the 
regression to investigate the effect of the different degree of exposure to risk on economic 
preferences. I also investigated the effects of farmers’ economic preferences on the adoption 
of certain adaptation measures. The variables included in the model were mainly based on the 
degree of their theoretical importance and their significant impact on economic preferences 
and adaptation measures. 
5.3.1 Factors influencing economic preferences 
The correlation between the economic preferences and the socioeconomic characteristics of 
respondents was estimated by the standard linear regression and the results are shown in Table 
9. In order to obtain heteroscedasticity-robust coefficients, the regressions results were 
obtained from 10000 bootstrapping repetitions. The results on most explanatory variables are 
as expected and are statistically significant at the 10% significance level or lower. The results 
of Chi square show that the Wald statistics are highly significant (𝑝	 < 	0.000) in all the 
models, suggesting that the explanatory power of the regression model is very strong. Below I 
discuss the results on each of the economic preferences considered in this study. 
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5.3.1.1 Risk Aversion 
The results on the relationship between farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics and their risk 
preferences is presented in column (1) of Table 13. The result on the impact of exposure to 
different degrees of risk on respondents’ risk preferences revealed that, respondents tend to be 
more risk averse when they are exposed to a high degree of risk than when they are exposed to 
a low degree of risk. This implies that the presence of high degree of risks that cannot be 
avoided makes individuals more risk averse in general when they have the chance to choose 
other avoidable risk. This is consistent with the result of Cameron and Shah (2012), who 
reported that respondents exposed to flood and earthquake in Indonesia exhibit higher levels 
of risk aversion compared to unexposed respondents. 
The results also show that income generally has a negative impact on the risk aversion of 
respondents. In particular, richer farmers are less risk averse and poor farmers. This implies 
that, very poor farmers are more risk averse in general, thereby, contributing for them to be 
trapped in poverty (Liu, 2013; Tanaka et al., 2010). This finding is consistent with many other 
literatures in developing countries in Asia (Tanaka et al., 2010; Liu, 2013) and Africa (Yesuf 
and Bluffstone, 2009; Liebenehm and Waibel, 2014). It can be observed that, there is a positive 
correlation between age and risk aversion, suggesting that the elderly are more risk averse, 
which is also consistent with similar findings in developing countries (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 
2009; Nguyen and Leung 2010; Tanaka et al., 2010; Liebenehm and Waibel, 2014). 
On the effect of education on risk aversion, I found out that education, in general, makes people 
less risk averse. This result is consistent with the findings of Liebenehm and Waibel (2014) 
among cattle farmers in West Africa, which states that formal education of respondents is 
negatively correlated risk aversion. The implication of this result is that, education in Ghana 
makes people more open towards taking up risky opportunities. This may, therefore, help better 
extension services in the adoption of adaptation strategies, which have an inherent associated 
risk involved. The impact of education on risk aversion is rather different in Asia, where results 
of Tanaka et al (2010) and Nguyen (2011) indicate that more years of education may have more 
positive effects on risk aversion. 
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Table 13: Factors influencing farmers’ economic preferences 
Variables Risk (Steps)22 Loss Impatience Impatience Cooperation 
Treated -10.88*** 0.258** 381.7*** -39.68 0.690*** 
 (1.67) (0.123) (93.64) (77.80) (0.083) 
Risk Aversion  0.079***  -38.75*** -0.010*** 
  (0.005)  (3.467) (0.003) 
Income 0.0211*** -0.0001 -1.089*** -1.213** -3.3e-05 
 (0.0034) (0.0002) (0.159) (0.581) (0.0002) 
Age -0.517*** 0.007 21.82*** 1.786 0.007 
 (0.112) (0.008) (6.94) (4.808) (0.006) 
Education      
No Edu. Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
Basic Edu. 9.677*** 0.001 -716.6*** -342.6*** 0.033 
 (2.615) (0.196) (154.3) (113.9) (0.120) 
S’dary Edu. 17.35*** 0.320* -1,211*** -538.4*** 0.130 
 (3.106) (0.180) (172.8) (134.7) (0.113) 
Farm Size 0.951 -0.061 -66.42 -29.57 -0.024 
 (0.797) (0.064) (41.87) (40.08) (0.038) 
Depend 2.614* -0.094 -89.78 11.53 0.044 
 (1.532) (0.116) (80.47) (62.21) (0.073) 
Constant -29.77*** -0.268 6,660*** 5506*** 3.476*** 
 (9.901) (0.696) (477.8) (386.4) (0.464) 
R-squared 0.671 0.805 0.666 0.822 0.436 
10000 Bootstrap Standard Errors in parenthesis 
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
5.3.1.2 Loss Aversion 
The correlation between respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics and loss aversion is 
shown in column (2) of Table 13. Respondents in the control group were found to be more loss 
averse than their counterparts in the treated group after controlling for respondents’ risk 
preferences and their socioeconomic characteristics. This implies that respondents who are 
exposed to high degree of risk that cannot be avoided tends to be less averse to losses when 
their risk preference behaviours are considered. This is result contradicts the earlier result that 
the treated group is more loss averse compared to the control group when respondents’ risk 
preference behaviours are not considered (see Section 5.2.2). In effect, it can be argued that the 
effect of exposure to risk on loss aversion is inconclusive. The results also show that there is a 
																																																						
22 With respect to the interpretation of the coefficients on risk aversion with number of steps taken, it has to be 
considered that a negative value of the coefficient implies that the variable has a positive impact on risk aversion 
and we call it a positive correlation with risk aversion. 
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positive relationship between risk aversion and loss aversion. In other words, respondents who 
are highly loss averse are also highly risk averse, indicating that the task maybe influenced by 
risk aversion.  
The results also show that there is a negative correlation between the level of education and 
loss aversion. In particular, highly educated respondents were found to be less loss averse. 
There is also a negative correlation between age and loss aversion and a positive correlation 
between income and loss aversion. However, these results were not statistically significant, 
indicating that age and income does not influence loss aversion. 
5.3.1.3 Impatient Levels 
The relationship between farmers’ impatient levels, which is measured by respondents’ 
subjective interest rate and their socioeconomic characteristics are presented in column (3) of 
Table 13. The result show that respondents in the treated group are more impatient than their 
counterparts in the control group. In particular, the subjective annual interest rate of 
respondents in the treated group is 381.7% more than the subjective interest rate of respondents 
in the control group. This implies that the high degree of exposure to risk makes individuals 
more impatient than the low degree of exposure to risk. In effect, it can be concluded that the 
presence of risk that cannot be avoided tends to make individuals more impatient (see Section 
5.2.3) even after controlling for household socioeconomic characteristics. This confirms the 
findings of Ali Bchir and Willinger (2013) who consider volcanic threats in Peru and reported 
that exposure to volcanic threats makes poor households more impatient, but contradicts the 
findings of Callen (2015). 
The results also indicate that there is a negative correlation between income and impatient 
levels of respondents, which implies that poor people are generally less patient. There is also a 
positive correlation between education and patience, with better educated respondents being 
more patient. Just like the results on the relationship between risk aversion and income, these 
results were also consistent with findings in developing countries in Asia and Africa (Tanaka 
et al., 2010; Nyugen, 2011; Liebenehm and Waibel, 2014). The age of the respondent was 
found to have a negative correlation with patient. In particular, the elderly is more impatient, 
which is consistent with findings in Africa (Liebenehm and Waibel, 2014) and contradicts 
findings in Asia (Tanaka et al. 2010; Nyugen, 2011). The positive correlation between age and 
impatient level of respondents in Africa may be as a result of the fact that there is no formal 
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social protection for the elderly in Africa making investment with returns in the far future less 
attractive to the elderly. 
5.3.1.4 Cooperation 
The last column of Table 13 shows the relationship between respondents’ socioeconomic 
characteristics and their level of cooperation. The results show that respondents in the treated 
group were more willing to contribute to for a common purpose, indicating that high degree of 
exposure to risk that cannot be avoided makes people more cooperative. In particular, 
respondents in the treated group were significantly willing to 0.8 more of their endowment than 
their counterparts the control group. Several studies have reported that there is a correlation 
between risk aversion and cooperation. For instance, according to Charness and Villeval 
(2009), subjects who invested more in a risky asset contributed less to a public good. Similar 
result has been reported by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002), Raub and Snijders (1997). 
Other studies also did not find significant effect of risk aversion on cooperation (Van Assen 
and Snijders, 2004; Kocher et al., 2015). The results from this study show that there is a positive 
relationship between risk aversion and cooperation, indicating that the more risk averse 
respondents are more cooperative and confirming the findings of Charness and Villeval (2009), 
Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis (2002) and Raub and Snijders (1997).  
However, these studies only elicited the risk preferences of respondents and their contribution 
for a common purpose and found a correlation between risk aversion and cooperation. In 
addition, this study exogenously exposed respondents to different degree of risk and the results 
show that respondents exposed to high degree of risk are more cooperative, implying that the 
presence of background risk makes respondents more cooperative. This implies that 
cooperation serves as a form of insurance to respondents who are exposed to risk. This is a 
very important result because it is the first paper that measures the relationship between the 
correlation between exposure to risk and cooperation. 
There is a negative relationship between respondents’ level of income and their level of 
cooperation. This implies that poorer households are more willing to contribute higher amount 
for the production of a public good than richer households. The elderly was also found to be 
more cooperative based on the positive correlation between age and the average contribution 
of respondents. It was also revealed that the more educated respondents are less cooperative. 
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however, none of the socioeconomic characteristics are significant in the model controlling for 
risk aversion. 
As earlier stated, a Kruskal-Wallis test showed that, there is a significant difference in the value 
of losses within the treated group. A further test using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that, 
the difference in the value of losses within the treated group was caused by the high value of 
losses in the Tampia community. In effect, as a robustness check, similar analysis was done 
without the Tampia community and the results do not change significantly. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the results are robust to exclusion. 
5.3.2 Farmers’ willingness to access credit and economic preferences 
To identify the linkage between farmers’ economic preferences and their decisions on whether 
to access credit to invest in their farms or not, I adopted a logistic regression model. One 
common problem associated with logistic regression model is the multicollinearity among the 
independent variables. I, therefore, tested for the presence of multicollinearity in this model by 
using tolerance and variance inflation factor (VIF). The result of the tolerance and VIF after 
the logistic regression shows that some of the explanatory variables have VIF above the 
threshold of 10, indicating that multicollinearity is a serious problem (see column (1) of 
Appendix C). These variables were thus centred23 and used for the estimation after testing for 
multicollinearity (see Appendix C). In addition, jackknife robust standard errors was used to 
obtain heteroscedasticity-robust coefficients. The regression results from the logistic model of 
which access to credit is the dependent variable is presented in Table 14.  
The signs of the coefficient of most of the explanatory variables are expected. The results of 
the Wald Chi square also show that the likelihood ratio statistics are highly significant (𝑝	 <0.01), suggesting that the explanatory power of the regression models are strong. The results 
show that, being in the treated reduces the likelihood of farmers to access credit in the model 
without economic preferences. However, this result was only significant in the model without 
the economic preferences and the model with loss aversion. This implies that, different degree 
of exposure to risk have a significant effect on willingness to access credit but when the 
economic preferences are included in the model, the channel through which different degree 
																																																						
23 I subtracted the mean of the variables from each of the observation to correct for the multicollinearity in the 
model. 
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of exposure operates on access credit is mainly through risk aversion, which reduces 
respondents’ probability to access credit to invest in farms.  
Table 14: Economic preferences and farmers’ willingness to access credit 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Treated -1.388** -0.383 -1.027 -1.150* -0.440 0.281 
 (0.535) (0.696) (0.624) (0.622) (0.650) (0.859) 
Cooperation24     -1.287*** -0.962 
     (0.466) (0.635) 
Loss Aversion25     0.949***   
    (0.265)   
Impatient26   -0.001***   0.001 
   (0.0003)   (0.001) 
Risk Aversion27  0.108***    0.142*** 
  (0.032)    (0.050) 
Income 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.072** -0.026 -0.046 -0.030 -0.052 -0.023 
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.039) (0.044) (0.036) (0.048) 
Education       
   No Education Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
   Basic Education 1.316** 0.307 0.718 1.109* 1.276* 0.506 
 (0.577) (0.670) (0.627) (0.600) (0.686) (0.772) 
   S’dary Education 2.171*** 0.917 1.112 1.099 2.054*** 1.373 
 (0.605) (0.951) (0.736) (0.818) (0.608) (0.984) 
Farm Size -0.298 -0.345 -0.400 -0.433* -0.297 -0.272 
 (0.238) (0.242) (0.249) (0.261) (0.247) (0.241) 
Dependency Ratio 0.922** 0.687 0.831* 0.973** 0.829* 0.636 
 (0.454) (0.446) (0.483) (0.422) (0.488) (0.453) 
Constant -3.426*** -5.326*** 0.138 -4.563*** 1.161 -5.319 
 (1.264) (1.242) (1.832) (1.259) (1.930) (3.593) 
Observation 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Pseudo R2 0.4152 0.5446 0.464 0.5346 0.4496 0.5642 
Jackknife Standard Errors in parenthesis 
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
																																																						
24 Cooperation is represented by the average contribution of respondents over the 10 periods, with higher values 
representing more cooperation. 
25 Loss aversion is represented by the switching point from B to A, with lower switching point indicating more 
loss aversion. 
26 Impatient level is represented by the subjective interest rate of respondents, with higher subjective interest rate 
indicating high impatient levels. 
27 Risk aversion is represented by the number of steps taken, with fewer steps representing more risk aversion.	
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It is hypothesized that risk-loving individuals will have a higher probability to make risky 
decisions than risk averse respondents. The estimation results from the logistic regression 
confirm this hypothesis. This is because, accessing credit to invest in farms, which is deem to 
be a very high-risk decision, is positively influenced by low risk aversion. In other words, the 
results show that risk seeking farmers are more likely to access credit to invest in their farms 
than risk averse farmers. That is, in general, being highly risk averse reduces the probability of 
the farmer to access credit to invest in their farms. This confirms the findings of Boucher et al. 
(2008), who reported that, some farmers in Peru are not willing to access formal credit market, 
even if it would help raise their productivity and income levels because of risk.  
The result also shows that there is a positive correlation between patience and respondents 
willingness to access credit. This implies that more patient respondents are more likely to 
access credit than impatient individuals. It was also revealed that respondents who are more 
willing to cooperate are less likely to access credit to invest in their farms. The economic 
preferences on their own were highly significant after controlling for all the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the respondents. However, when I combine all the economic preferences, 
only risk aversion has a significant effect on respondents’ willingness to access credit, 
indicating that risk aversion have a strong significant effect of respondents’ willingness to 
access credit. 
Farmers’ household income is positively and significantly associated with farmer’s willingness 
to access credit for farming. In effect, it can be anticipated that less risk averse individuals like 
richer households are more likely to access credit to invest in their farms. This finding is not 
surprising as it is hypothesised that richer farmers are more willing to take risky decisions. The 
ratio of household members not working to household members working is also shown to have 
a significant positive relationship with farmers’ decision to access credit, indicating that 
households with more younger members are more likely to access credit. However, this result 
is not significant in the full model with all the economic preferences (Model 6). 
As expected, the coefficient on farmers’ education level is positive in all the models. However, 
this result was only significant in the models without the economic preferences, model with 
loss aversion and cooperation. In the literature, an individual’s education level has been 
regarded as a good indicator for his/her ability to understand and use financial tools (Outreville, 
2015), which access to financial credit is one of them. The results, therefore, indicates that 
better educated farmers can better understand the positive implications of accessing credit to 
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invest in farms and thus make them more willing to access credit. In effect, promotional efforts 
to improve farmers access to credit can focus on the ways in which the positive implications 
of accessing credit are better explained and communicated to local farmers. Being in the treated 
group was also found to reduces the likelihood of farmers to access credit. However, this result 
was only significant in the model without the economic preferences and the model with loss 
aversion. This implies that, different degree of exposure to risk does not have any significant 
effect on willingness to access credit when I control for all economic preferences. 
5.3.3 Farmers’ economic preferences and insurance uptake and willingness to invest in 
Drainage  
In order investigate the relationship between farmers’ economic preferences and their decisions 
on purchasing weather index insurance and willingness to pay for drainage systems, I adopted 
the standard regression model. Farmers’ willingness to pay for insurance and drainage can 
reasonably expected to be different across groups because they need them more. Nevertheless, 
it is interesting to analyse the transmission mechanism through which the exposure to risk 
impacts these adaptation strategies. The dependent variable is the natural log of the amount of 
money farmers are willing to pay. I adopted the log-transformation of the farmer’s willingness 
to pay as the dependent variable because Schlenker et al. (2006) suggests that a log-
transformation outperforms a linear specification, since the distribution is non-negative. The 
explanatory variables are household’s socioeconomic factors, which include farmer’s 
household income, level of education, age, farm size, dependency ratio, location and the 
economic preference parameters. Two common problems with regression standard linear 
regression analysis are the presence of multicollinearity and heteroskedastic error terms. As 
stated earlier, there are two important indices for multicollinearity diagnosis: tolerance and the 
VIF. The diagnosis results show that the smallest tolerance was greater than 0.17 and the larger 
VIF was less than 5.75 (see Appendix D), thereby indicating that there is little multicollinearity 
between these independent variables.  
5.3.3.1 Farmers’ risk preferences and insurance uptake 
The regression results on the relationship between farmers’ economic preferences and their 
decisions on purchasing weather index insurance from the standard linear regression model, 
with heteroscedasticity-robust coefficient estimates are presented in Table 15. Most of the 
explanatory variables are expected and the F statistics also shows that the overall the models 
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are all statistically significant (𝑝	 < 	0.00), indicating that the explanatory power of the 
regression models is strong. The results show that respondents in the treated group are more 
willing to pay higher premiums for agricultural insurance compared to their counterparts in the 
control group even after controlling for the socioeconomic characteristics of respondents. In 
particular, this result is statistically significant in all the models, except the model with risk 
preferences and the model controlling for all economic preferences (Model 2 and 6 of Table 
15). This implies that the treatment is effect is still there after individually controlling for each 
of the economic preferences. However, if I control for all economic preferences, the treatment 
effect vanishes, with the only significant variable being the risk preferences of respondents, 
thereby making risk aversion the main transmission of making the treated group willing to pay 
high insurance premiums.  
The estimated results of farmers’ willingness to pay for insurance confirm the assertion that 
risk averse individuals will have a higher probability to take up agricultural insurance than risk 
seeking individuals (Jin et al., 2016). The coefficient of risk aversion is negative and 
significant, indicating that risk aversion is positively related to farmer’s adoption of agricultural 
insurance to reduce the impact of climate shocks on their households. This is consistent with 
standard economic theory and the existing literature on the relationship between individuals’ 
risk preferences and insurance uptake decisions (Simon and Fiorentino, 2014; Jin et al., 2016). 
There is a positive correlation between impatience and respondents’ willingness to pay for 
insurance.  
This implies that less patient respondents are more likely to pay high insurance premiums. In 
particular, an insurance in the subjective interest rate of respondents by 1 unit increases their 
willingness to pay as insurance premium by 0.01%. The results also show that there is a positive 
correlation between loss aversion and willingness to pay for agricultural insurance. 
Cooperation, however, did not have any significant effect on respondents’ willingness to pay 
for agricultural insurance. It is also worth noting that, even though risk and time preferences 
are individually statistically significant predictors of respondents’ willingness to pay for 
agricultural insurance after controlling for respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics, only 
their risk preference was statistically significant when all the economic preferences are 
combined together in one model (see Model 6 in Table 15). This implies that respondents’ risk 
preferences have a strong significant effect on respondents’ willingness to pay for agricultural 
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insurance than all the other economic preferences, with risk aversion having a strong positive 
effect on respondents’ willingness to pay for insurance. 
Table 15: Economic preferences and farmers’ willingness to pay for agricultural insurance 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Treated 0.153*** 0.031 0.102** 0.099** 0.114** 0.034 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.044) (0.041) (0.051) (0.045) 
Cooperation     0.049 -0.004 
     (0.037) (0.035) 
Loss Aversion     -0.090***   
    (0.018)   
Impatient   0.0001***   -4.8E-06 
   (3.2E-05)   (3.8E-05) 
Risk Aversion  -0.011***    -0.011*** 
  (0.002)    (0.002) 
Income -0.0002** 8.2E-05 -9.4E-06 -1.4E-05 -0.0001* 8.1E-05 
 (7.5E-05) (7.7E-05) (8.0E-05) (7.8E-05) (7.5E-05) (7.8E-05) 
Age 0.006** 0.0003 0.003 0.003 0.006* 0.0004 
 (0.003) (0.0025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education       
   No Education Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
   Basic Education -0.120** -0.012 -0.023 -0.052 -0.117** -0.014 
 (0.055) (0.053) (0.058) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) 
   S’dary Education -0.173** 0.021 -0.013 -0.021 -0.171** 0.019 
 (0.072) (0.067) (0.074) (0.064) (0.072) (0.074) 
Farm Size 0.004 0.015 0.013 0.006 0.006 0.015 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
Dependency Ratio -0.046 -0.017 -0.034 -0.036 -0.047 -0.016 
 (0.045) (0.040) (0.043) (0.041) (0.045) (0.040) 
Constant 3.921*** 3.588*** 3.041*** 3.685*** 3.736*** 3.628*** 
 (0.248) (0.228) (0.325) (0.243) (0.281) (0.303) 
Observation 200 200 200 200 200 200 
Pseudo R2 0.219 0.374 0.289 0.326 0.225 0.375 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
It can be anticipated that more risk averse individuals like poorer households would be more 
likely to adopt agricultural insurance as natural shock adaptation strategy. This is because, it is 
hypothesized that, farmers with higher total income tend to be less risk averse and have a 
smaller demand for insurance (Wang et al., 2016). Wang et al. (2016) also argue that, the 
decision to buy agricultural insurance is affected by many factors and thus, instead of 
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purchasing insurance, richer farmers could recover through other means such as off-farm 
investments, if their farms are damaged by bad weather conditions. This hypothesis is 
confirmed by the results on the impact of household income on risk aversion among farmers 
in our sample (columns 1 of Table 13) and the result on the impact of household income on 
uptake of agricultural insurance (model 1 of Table 15). These results show that farmers’ 
household income is negatively related to the amount farmers are willing to pay as agricultural 
insurance premium in almost all the models except the model with time preferences and the 
model with all economic preferences. However, the results are only significant in the model 
without economic preferences and cooperation model. The insignificant results confirm the 
findings of Wang et al. (2016), whereas the significant results confirm the findings of Jin et al. 
(2016). 
In general, the elderly has been estimated in the literature to be more risk averse compared to 
the young (Yesuf and Bluffstone, 2009; Nguyen and Leung 2010; Tanaka et al., 2010; 
Liebenehm and Waibel, 2014) and it is also hypothesized that risk averse individuals will have 
the higher probability to be covered by an insurance than risk-seeking individuals (Jin et al., 
2016). The estimated results indicate that age has a positive significant relationship with the 
amount farmers are willing to pay for agricultural insurance, thereby confirming this 
hypothesis. 
Even though, the literature suggests that an individuals’ level of education is a good indicator 
for his/her ability to understand and use financial insurance (Enjorlras and Sentis 2011; Ye et 
al. 2016; Wang et al., 2016), the coefficient of farmer’s level of education was found to be 
negative and significant, indicating that better educated farmers were less incentivized to pay 
higher amount as insurance premium. This contradicts the findings of Wang et al. (2016) and 
Jin et al. (2016), whose results show that better educated farmers understand contracts better 
and thus are more willing to participate in insurance programs. However, I can argue that, 
better educated farmers are more likely to have other risk management strategies or have the 
opportunity to engage in a secondary occupation which provides them with additional income, 
thereby reducing their incentive to pay for crop insurance as a risk management strategy. 
5.3.3.2 Farmers’ risk preference and willingness to invest in drainage systems 
The regression results on the relationship between farmers’ economic preferences and their 
willingness to pay for drainage systems from the standard linear regression model, with 
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heteroscedasticity-robust coefficient estimates are presented in Table 16. The result of the F 
statistics also shows that the overall the models are all statistically significant (𝑝	 < 	0.00), 
indicating that the explanatory power of the regression models is strong.  
The results show that, farmers in the treated group were willing to pay higher for drainage 
systems than their colleagues in the control group both after controlling individually for the 
economic preferences and collectively for all the economic preferences, signalling a higher 
utility of drainage systems for the treated. This implies that high degree of exposure to natural 
shocks makes individuals more likely to make conscious effort to reduce the negative impacts 
of the shocks on their households. This confirms the results on the exposure of households to 
different degree of natural shocks and their willingness to cooperate, which states that high 
degree of exposure makes individuals more cooperative. The results also show that risk 
aversion is the main transmission mechanism through which the treated group contribute high 
for the provision of drainage system, which will help reduce the impact of floods on their farms 
and households. 
The results also show that there is a positive relationship between risk aversion and willingness 
to pay for investment in drainage systems. This implies that, more risk averse farmers will be 
willing to invest in reducing the impact of natural shocks on their farms by investing in drainage 
systems. The results also show that more impatient respondents are willing to pay higher 
amount for construction of drainage systems that will help reduce the impact of floods on their 
farms. Also, loss aversion was found to have a positive correlation with respondents’ 
willingness to contribute for the building of drainage system. In addition, the results from the 
study revealed that, on its own, cooperation has a positive correlation with respondents’ 
willingness to pay for drainage systems, which will help reduce the impact of floods on their 
farms and households. Surprisingly, if all the economic preferences are analysed together, the 
result is not significant. This may be as a result of the fact that there is a strong positive 
relationship between risk aversion and cooperation (see Table 12) 
It was also revealed by the results that, there is a significant negative correlation between 
income and respondents’ willingness to pay for drainage systems. This implies that, rather than 
investing their resources in reducing the impact of natural shocks on their farms and 
households, rich farmers would rather invest their resources in buying fertilizers, which will 
improve their yields. In particular, an increase in the income of respondents by one unit will 
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lead to a decrease in the amount respondents are willing to pay for provision of drainage system 
by 0.03% on the average.  
Table 16: Economic preferences and farmers’ willingness to pay for drainage systems 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Treated 0.411*** 0.218*** 0.316*** 0.326*** 0.326*** 0.209*** 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.051) (0.050) (0.064) (0.056) 
Cooperation     0.106** 0.016 
     (0.048) (0.041) 
Loss Aversion     -0.139***   
    (0.021)   
Impatient   0.0002***   6.1E-05 
   (3.4E-05)   (4.2E-05) 
Risk Aversion  -0.018***    -0.015*** 
  (0.002)    (0.003) 
Income -0.0004*** 1.5E-05 -8.8E-05 -0.0001 -0.0003*** 3.3E-05 
 (8.9E-05) (8.4E-05) (8.8E-05) (9.1E-05) (8.8E-05) (8.5E-05) 
Age 0.011*** 0.002 0.006* 0.006** 0.010*** 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Education       
   No Education Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference 
   Basic Education -0.156* 0.013 0.019 -0.052 -0.151* 0.033 
 (0.082) (0.059) (0.070) (0.064) (0.079) (0.059) 
   S’dary Education -0.367*** -0.063 -0.070 -0.134* -0.364*** -0.033 
 (0.080) (0.064) (0.068) (0.069) (0.078) (0.070) 
Farm Size 0.037 0.053*** 0.053** 0.039* 0.040* 0.055*** 
 (0.024) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) 
Dependency Ratio -0.097* -0.050 -0.074 -0.080* -0.098* -0.051 
 (0.051) (0.041) (0.048) (0.044) (0.051) (0.041) 
Initial Bid -0.0008 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 2.7E-05 0.001 
 (0.0040) (0.003) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant 4.232*** 3.650*** 2.529*** 3.808*** 3.788*** 3.246*** 
 (0.395) (0.334) (0.434) (0.379) (0.457) (0.460) 
Observation 200 200 200 200 200 200 
R2 0.475 0.655 0.588 0.594 0.489 0.66 
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis 
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Education was also found to have significant effects on the willingness to pay for drainage 
systems. In particular, highly educated farmers were found to have lower willingness to pay 
drainage systems, which would help reduce the risk of flood on respondents’ farms, than low 
educated farmers and farmers with no education who are more risk averse in general. The 
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results show that, being secondary educated decreases farmers willingness to pay for drainage 
systems by 36% on the average. Also, on the average, being primary educated decreases 
farmers willing to pay for drainage system by 15%. Dependency ratio was found to have a 
significant negative effect on the amount farmers were willing to invest on building of drainage 
systems. This implies that households with fewer family members working were more willing 
to make investment decisions on reducing the impact of flood on their farms and households. 
In particular, on the average, an increase in dependency ratio by 1 unit would lead to a reduction 
in the amount farmers are willing to contribute to build drainage systems by 9%. 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
Risk and uncertainty play a significant role in almost every important economic decision. For 
instance, economic preferences among farmers have been identified as important constraints 
that keep farmers from reaching their productive potential. However, contrary to standard 
economic hypothesis that indicates that individual’s preferences are stable, a growing body of 
research indicates that there is an endogenous link between individuals living environment and 
their economic preferences. The effect of the environment on preferences can be linked to 
background risk, which states that the presence of risks that cannot be avoided or insured 
against may make individuals less torrent towards other, avoidable risks.  
It is also important to note that agriculture plays a dominant role in the livelihoods of 
households in the sub-Saharan Africa, serving as a stimulus for economic growth, providing 
food security and assisting in poverty reduction. However, agriculture is susceptible to 
production and price risk, which impact farmers’ income and welfare. Adaptation, which seeks 
to lower the risks posed by the consequences of natural shocks, is considered the most 
important policy option in reducing the impact of natural shocks. It involves changes in 
agricultural management practices in response to changes in conditions. However, most 
adaptation strategies are also characterized by risk and uncertainty.  
In an attempt to investigate how economic preferences reacts to the environment, this study 
exploited a natural experiment implied by different degree of exposure to risk in terms of flood 
and the effects these risks have on the behavioural traits of farmers, which is their economic 
preferences, and their decision-making process in adopting adaptation strategies. In effect, 
communities that are highly prone to flood and are known to suffer high losses were considered 
as our treated group, while the least susceptible to flood communities were our control group. 
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Crucially for a field experiment, there is evidence that the experimental design was effective 
because the two groups were similar in terms of their socioeconomic and cultural 
characteristics ex ante but differ with respect to their degree of exposure to a natural shock. 
The results show that economic preferences are not stable, with different degree of exposure 
to risk having significant impact on individual's risk preferences, impatience level and 
cooperation. In particular, the results show that exposure to risk makes people more risk averse 
and impatient. The result also revealed that exposure to risk makes people more cooperative. 
This is a very important result because it is the first study that investigates the link between 
individuals' exposure to risk and cooperation. There was, however, no strong evidence on the 
effects of exposure to risk on loss aversion. It was also revealed by the study that the 
respondents in our sample have a strong degree of risk aversion in general, which is not 
consistent with the study of Vieider and I’Haridon (2016), which indicates that subjects in 
developing countries are generally less risk averse. This result may be as a result of the fact 
that both groups are significantly exposed to some degree of risk, thereby making the whole 
sample in general more risk averse confirming the theory of the relationship between 
background risk and risk preferences (Cameron and Shah, 2012). In addition, the result on the 
effect of different degree of exposure to risk was found to be significant even after controlling 
for household socioeconomic characteristics indicating that economic preferences are not 
stable. In all, it was revealed that exposure to risk makes individuals more risk averse, more 
impatient and more cooperative.  
On the factors that influences economic preferences, the results show that income generally 
has a negative impact on risk aversion, impatience, loss aversion and cooperation. In particular, 
poor farmers are more risk averse, more impatience, more loss averse and more cooperative. 
Therefore, improving the income level of farmers would better improve their economic 
preferences which help them to take make risky investment decisions. Education was also 
found to have a positive impact on economic preferences, except cooperation, with better 
educated respondents being less risk averse, more patient and less loss averse. The implication 
of this result is that; education makes people to be more open towards taking up risky 
opportunities. In effect, better extension services will help reduce risk aversion, loss aversion 
and impatient level of farmers in the adoption of coping strategies, which have an inherent 
associated risk involved. The results also revealed that age has a significant positive correlation 
with risk aversion and impatience, suggesting that the elderly are more risk averse and 
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impatient. The positive correlation between age and impatient level of respondents may be as 
a result of the fact that there is no formal social protection for the elderly in Ghana making 
investment with returns in the far future less attractive to the elderly. In effect, the government 
should institute policies that will help improve the livelihood of the elderly which will improve 
their patient levels and also make them take up risky investment. The elderly was also found 
to be more cooperative based on the positive correlation between age and the average 
contribution of respondents. 
The results on the effect of economic preferences on the adoption of adaptation strategies of 
respondents revealed that economic preferences individually have significant effects on 
farmers’ willingness to access credit, willingness to pay for agricultural insurance and 
willingness to pay for the construction of drainage systems to reduce the impact of flood on 
their farms. In particular, being more risk averse and more impatience reduces the likelihood 
of respondents to access credit to invest in their farms. More loss averse individuals as well as 
more cooperative individuals were also less likely to access credit to invest in their farms. 
Exposure to different degree of risk has a significant effect on all three adaptation strategies, 
but the main channel through which it impacts respondents’ adaptation decisions is through 
risk aversion. In particular, the results show that being exposed to high degree of risk makes 
respondents less likely to access credit to invest in their farms, more willing to pay higher 
agricultural insurance premium and more willing to contribute higher amount for the 
construction of drainage systems to reduce the impact of flood on their farms and households. 
Policy makers should, therefore, focus on improving the risk aversion behaviour of individuals 
by first reducing the degree of exposure of households to flood, which makes individuals more 
risk averse. Also, since the level of income was found influence risk aversion negatively, policy 
makers can influence individuals to make more risky investment by instituting policies that 
will help improve the income levels of households. The introduction of better extension 
services, which will help educate farmers on the risk involved in farming and the management 
practices that will help reduce risk aversion should also be the policy makers’ priority.  
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Appendix: 
Appendix A: Map showing the distribution of the average yield of all crops by districts. 
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Appendix B: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of the value of losses between communities 
Treated Group  Control Group 
Community Mean KS D p-value  Community Mean KS D p-value 
One 1059.83 0.45*
* 0.035 
 Six 564.58 0.25 0.56 
Two 959.45  Seven 531.33 
One 1059.83 0.3 0.329 
 Six 564.58 0.3 0.329 
Three 979.18  Eight 524.55 
One 1059.83 0.4* 0.082 
 Six 564.58 0.3 0.329 
Four 929.95  Nine 549.13 
One 1059.83 0.5** 0.013 
 Six 564.58 0.3 0.329 
Five 925.80  Ten 505.08 
Two 959.45 0.2 0.819 
 Seven 531.33 0.2 0.819 
Three 979.18  Eight 524.55 
Two 959.45 0.2 0.819 
 Seven 531.33 0.2 0.819 
Four 929.95  Nine 549.13 
Two 959.45 0.35 0.172 
 Seven 531.33 0.2 0.819 
Five 925.80  Ten 505.08 
Three 979.18 0.2 0.819 
 Eight 524.55 0.15 0.978 
Four 929.95  Nine 549.13 
Three 979.18 0.3 0.329 
 Eight 524.55 0.2 0.819 
Five 925.80  Ten 505.08 
Four 929.95 0.15 0.978 
 Nine 549.13 0.3 0.314 
Five 925.80  Ten 505.08 
***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Appendix C: Test of Multicollinearity in Willingness to Access Credit Model suing VIF 
Variable Uncentered Centred 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cooperation     3.59 
Loss Aversion    2.53  
Impatience   2.75   
Risk (Box Selected) 7.05 3.00    
Total Income 70.87 2.28 2.31 2.33 2.22 
Age 34.79 1.26 1.38 1.27 1.36 
Education      
      Basic Education 1.46 1.54 1.28 1.37 1.39 
      Secondary Education 2.14 2.17 1.45 2.06 1.69 
Treated 2.50 1.31 2.22 1.24 2.58 
Farm size 25.61 2.08 2.06 2.06 2.06 
Dependency Ratio 23.37 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.15 
Mean VIF 20.97 1.85 1.82 1.75 2.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Test of Multicollinearity in the willingness to pay for insurance model using VIF 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Cooperation     1.68 1.8 
Loss Aversion    2.1   
Impatience   2.99   5.72 
Risk (Box Selected)  3.04    5.75 
Total Income 2.2 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.24 2.86 
Age 1.34 1.46 1.41 1.39 1.37 1.47 
Education       
      Basic Education 1.17 1.27 1.34 1.23 1.18 1.35 
      Secondary Education 1.38 1.74 1.93 1.7 1.38 1.97 
Treated 1.03 1.25 1.12 1.1 1.58 1.69 
Farm size 2.06 2.08 2.08 2.06 2.07 2.09 
Dependency Ratio 1.15 1.16 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.17 
Mean VIF 1.48 1.85 1.84 1.65 1.58 2.59 
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Appendix E: Survey Questionnaire for farmers’ exposure to the risk of flood 
Date of interview: ____________________   Starting Time: _________________ 
End Time: ______________________            Interviewee No: ________________ 
Hello, how are you? Thank you in advance for giving time for this interview. I am Mr. Ebo 
Botchway. This interview is part of the main body of a research in partial fulfillment of a PhD 
degree in Economics. Your response to these questions is anonymous and we would treat it 
with utmost confidentiality. This interview is strictly for academic purposes and therefore 
honest discussion is the best way ahead. Thank you for your kind co-operation. 
I.      Demographic Characteristics of the Respondent 
1. Gender?   1. Male     2.  Female  
2. Age? ___________ Years. 
3. Marital status (please tick one):  
1. Single  2.  Married   3.  Separated/Divorced    4. Other    (e.g. cohabitation 
without marriage) please Specify _____________ 
4. Household size ___________ (No. of family members) 
5. No. of Adults__________ No. of Children (those less than 15 years) ___________ 
6. Religion? 
1. Christian  2.  Muslim  3. Traditional   4. Other   (specify _______) 
7. Level of Education 
1. No Education  2.  Basic  3. Secondary   4. Tertiary    
8. Years involved in active farming____________ 
9. What is the total size of your farms in the previous year? ___________acres. 
10. Which of these crops did you cultivate last year? (Select as many as possible)  
1. Maize  2. Sorghum  3. Rice  4. Millet  5. Cassava  6. Yam    
7. Groundnut  8. Cowpea  9. Other______________________ 
11. On the average, what was your total income from crops for last year? 
Crop Total Yield (Bags) Bags Sold Price per Bag (GH¢) Total 
Income 
Maize     
Sorghum     
Rice     
Millet     
Cassava     
Yam     
Groundnut     
Cowpea     
Other     
12. Do you have other sources of income every year?  
1. Yes    2. No  
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If NO skip to Question 13 
13. If yes, what are the other sources of income? (Select as many as possible) 
1. Working on someone’s farm   2. Off-farm employment   3. Remittances     
4. Other   (please specify ___________) 
14. How much money do you get from other sources per year? 
Source  Amount (GH¢) 
Working on someone’s farm  
Off-farm employment  
Remittances  
Other  
15. How many people in your family (including yourself) earn their own income ___________ and 
what is their gross income _________________ either from employment or business or others 
activities?  
16. Are you supporting any person from your disposable monthly income?   
1. Yes    2. No     
17. If yes, how much money did you spend per month for this purpose? ______________in 
Ghana cedis. 
18. Are you getting money from anybody in addition to your monthly income?  
1. Yes  2. No    
19. If yes, how much money did you earn per month? ______________GH¢? 
II.     Migration 
20. Have you always lived in this community? 1. Yes  2. No    
If YES skip to Question 27 
21. Where did you moved from?  
1. Moved from different part of the district   2.Moved from different part of the region 
  3. Moved from different part of the country  4. Moved from another country   
22. Why did you move to this community?  
1. Because the soil is fertile  2. Because floods are not frequent here    
3. Because there is a dam for irrigation  
4. Because I have a family here and want to move closer   5. Other   ( specify____) 
23. How long have you stayed in this this community? ______ years _____months 
 
24. How has your decision to move improve your farming? 
1. Very useless  2. Useless   3. No Change  4. Useful  5. Very Useful  
25. How has your decision to move improve your farm income? 
1. Very useless  2. Useless   3. No Change  4. Useful  5.Very Useful  
 
26. How has your decision to move improve the overall wellbeing of your family? 
1. Very useless  2. Useless   3. No Change  4. Useful  5.Very Useful  
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III.     Respondents’ Perception about FLOOD 
27. Did you experience any flood during the last year growing season?  
1. Yes    2. No  
28. If yes, on the average, how would you estimate the damage caused by the flood in terms 
of crops? _______________ 
Crop Total Loss (Bags) 
Maize  
Sorghum  
Rice  
Millet  
Cassava  
Yam  
Groundnut  
Cowpea  
Other  
Other  
29. Is flood more recurrent in the last 5 years? 
1. Yes    2. No  
30. Do the losses stated in Question 28 differ from the average losses over the last 5 years? 
1. Yes    2. No  
31. Have you done anything to reduce the impact of flood on your household if it were to 
occur again?                 
1. Yes    2. No  
32. What action have you taken to reduce this impact? (Select as many as appropriate) 
1. Taken credit to invest in farms    2. Crop insurance     
3. Moved to a least flood prone area.   4. Use Improved variety of crop      
5. Change planting dates    6. Building dams for irrigation      
7. Investing in drainage infrastructure     8. Other   (please specify ___________) 
33. Is flood more recurrent in the last 5 years compared to the last 10 years? 
1. Yes    2. No  
34. Have the authorities (eg. Government agencies like MOFA, District Assemblies) made 
any effort to reduce the risk of flood and drought in the district?       
1. Yes    2. No  
35. What are some of the efforts being made?  
1. Policies to give credit to invest in farms  2. Promoting Crop insurance  3. 
Building dams for irrigation 4. Investing in drainage infrastructure            5. Other   
(please specify________________). 
 
36. Have the members in the community made any effort to reduce the risk of flood and 
drought in the community?      
1. Yes    2. No  
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37. What are some of the efforts being made?  
1.Giving credit to affected households with low interest  
2. Promoting informal crop insurance through ROSCA   
3. Building dams for irrigation  4. Investing in drainage infrastructure   
5. Other   (please specify________________). 
38. Will you be willing to take loan to invest in your farming?  
1. Yes    2. No  
39. If Yes, how much will you be willing to borrow per growing season? ________GH¢ 
40. Will you be willing to insure your farm against flood?  
1. Yes    2. No  
41. If yes, how much will you be will to pay per Arce? _____________GH¢ 
42. Please state the biggest impediments you face when deciding to take some strategies that 
will help reduce the negative impacts of flood and drought on your crops (Please Rank 
them) 
IMPEDIMENT RANK 
Lack of financial resources/credit to purchase farm implements, fertilizers and pay hired 
labour 
 
Technological barriers  
Lack of Information on cost and benefits    
Lack of infrastructural development including ready market  
Social-cultural barriers such as belief system and local norms  
Lack of institutional capacity to facilitate agricultural adaptation  
Other  
Other  
Other  
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Interviewer: Now read the Hypothetical Scenario to your respondents. Make sure that 
they pay attention of your description 
A. Building drainage system around farmlands  
I would like to ask you how much it is worth to you in monetary terms, the provision of a 
drainage system to combat flooding of farms. The provision of the drainage system among 
other things means, farmers will have the opportunity to protect their farmlands from flooding 
when there is excess rainfall during the growing season. It is also important to note that, the 
drainage system can help the farmer to reduce loss of yield whenever there is excess rainfall 
by about 90%. However, this drainage system is also expensive and thus need investment. For 
building the dam for irrigation, assume the district agricultural office is committed in helping 
farmers to build drainage system. However, before a farmer can have a drainage system around 
his/her farm, he/she must contribute a yearly fee for the cost of building and for maintaining it. 
Let us now assume that, you have an option to have this drainage system built around your 
farm to help reduce the loss of yield from excess rainfall. 
 
A1. Do you think your household would be willing to pay GH¢____for access to the 
service? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
                                       YES                                       NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         YES                     NO                       YES                NO 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
A2. Think for a moment, what is the largest amount of money your household would be 
willing to pay per year to use this service? If it would cost your household more than 
this amount, your household could not afford to pay and would not be able to use the 
service. 
                  Amount of money________________ GH¢ per year 
 
ASK THE WTP QUESTIONS 
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B. Adoption of Fertilizer  
I would like to ask you again, how much it is worth to you in monetary terms, the adoption of 
fertilizers. The adoption of fertilizers mean among other things that, farmers will have the 
opportunity increase their crop yield by about 50% every growing season. Assume the 
government is committed in subsiding the cost of fertilizers so that smallholder farmers can 
afford it. In this case, before you can get a bag of fertilizer to be used on your farm, toy will 
have to pay the subsidised amount for it.  
 
B1. Do you think your household would be willing to pay GH¢___ for a bag of fertilizer? 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                
                                       YES                                       NO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         YES                     NO                      YES                NO 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
B2. Think for a moment, what is the largest amount of money your household would be 
willing to pay per year to use this service? If it would cost your household more than 
this amount, your household could not afford to pay and would not be able to use the 
service. 
                  Amount of money________________ GH¢ per bag of fertilizer. 
 
THANK YOU. 
 
 
 
ASK THE WTP QUESTIONS 
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Appendix F: An Experiment to Elicit Risk Preferences of Farmers 
In eliciting the risk preferences, I will use the static version of Bomb Risk Elicitation Task. 
The static version can be played with pen and paper. Because farmers may find it difficult to 
understand the original version of the task where subjects are face with a 10x10 square of which 
each cell represents a box, the layout has been change for younger children to understand. 
The layout has been changed to represent a road with steps in which a bomb is hidden. In this 
case, the subject is asked to start from the starting point of the road and walk towards the end 
of the road. This will be more intuitive to people who do not have higher levels of education. 
Instruction for the game: The Bomb Risk Elicitation Task with pen and paper. 
On the decision sheet of The Bomb Game there is a drawing of a winding road with exactly 
one hundred steps and they are numbered 1 through 100. 
 
In this approach, subjects are asked to imagine to be on a minefield, which has 100 boxes on 
the road. A subject gain 1 point for every box he/she pick on the minefield.  
In this game, you have to imagine that you are in a minefield, and on the winding road that 
you see on the paper sheet, exactly 1 bomb is hidden behind one of the 100 numbers. You gain 
1 point for every step you take. You have to start at step 1, then 2, 3 and so on. You indicate 
every step you take by writing a cross over that number (show them how to mark the number), 
and you continue until you reach the step where you want to stop. You also have to write the 
number of steps that you finally decide you want to take in the box below on your left. (Please 
show them the box.) You do not know the bomb’s location. None of us do. You only know that 
it is equally likely to be behind any of the hundred steps on the winding road. After you have 
decided on the number of steps to take by writing a cross on each step, I will determine where 
the bomb is located by rolling two ten-sided dice (00 and 0=100). The die will be shown to the 
subjects. 
If the number where the bomb is located is higher than the number of steps you have taken, 
you have not stepped on the bomb and you earn 1 point for each of the steps you have taken. If 
the number where the bomb is located is lower than or equal to the number of steps you have 
decided to take, you have stepped on the bomb and lose all your points; it means that you get 
zero points. So, the more steps you take, the more points you can make, but the risk that you 
will step on the bomb is also higher. 
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Example 
Try an example to see if they understand the Experiment: 
Assuming Kwame takes 25 steps and the bomb is hidden behind number 21.  
Will he have stepped on the bomb? (Yes or No) 
How many points will he get? 
What if Kwame walks 75 steps and the bomb is hidden at step number 79, how many points 
will he get? 
Suppose Kwame walks 48 steps and the bomb also is hidden at number 48, how many points 
will he get? 
Does the number of steps Kwame decides to take have an influence on which step the bomb is 
located? (Yes or No) 
Decision 
You now have two minutes to make you decision. I will roll the dice afterwards and I will see 
where the bomb is located. You can begin now.” 
Ask subjects “How many steps will you take?” 
 
The participants have two minutes to make their decision, and they also write it numerically 
below the winding road. The researcher and his assistant will assist and check that this has been 
done for all the participants, before researcher roll the two ten-sided dice to determine the 
location of the bomb. The decision sheets are thereafter collected by the experimenters, and the 
research assistant starts to enter the data in the Excel sheet. 
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The Bomb Game    
Imagine that you are in minefield and 1 bomb is hidden behind one of the 100 numbers 
below.  
You gain GH¢0.50 for every step you take. If you step on the bomb you lose all your money.  
How many steps will you take? Put a cross at every step you take. 
The location of the bomb will afterwards be determined by a roll of two ten-sided dice.  
 
         Start here 
 
1          
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
         12 
22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 
23          
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 
         34 
44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 
45          
46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 
         56 
66 65 64 63 62 61 60 59 58 57 
67          
68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 
         78 
88 87 86 85 84 83 82 81 80 79 
89          
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
         100 
Number of steps:               Points: 
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Appendix G: An Experiment to Elicit Loss Aversion Behaviour of Farmers 
In this game, you will be given a sheet of paper which is worth ¢10. This ¢10 worth of paper 
will be given to each and every one of you before I start the game. There is this table below, 
which represents 10 decision points to be taken by you. In each of the 10 decision points, you 
will be asked to indicate your preference between 2 options, Option A and Option B.  
Option A implies that; you will keep the ¢10 given to you before the beginning of this game.  
Option B implies that, you will have the chance to either win an additional ¢10, which will be 
added to the ¢10 I gave you before the start of this game or you will lose some part of or all of 
the money I gave you before the start of the game by a toss of a coin.  
In other words, if you choose option B, I will toss a coin to find out whether you will win 
additional ¢10 to make you total earnings ¢20 or you will lose some part of the money I gave 
you before the game. 
Before the toss of the coin, I will ask you to choose either a head or a tail. If you choose head 
and head come up or you choose tail and tail comes up, then, it means that you have won an 
additional ¢10, which will be added to the initial ¢10 given to you before the start of the game 
making your total earning ¢20.  
However, if you choose head and tail comes up or you choose tail and head comes up, then 
you will lose some part of the money I gave you before the start of the game. 
How the participants will be paid: 
At the end of this game, you will select one out of the 10 decision points. I will pay for the 
decision you made at the decision point you will select from the box.  This is how you will 
select the number; I will write numbers 1 to 10 on pieces of paper and then fold them and put 
them in a box. Each of these numbers represent a decision point, with 1 representing decision 
point 1, 2 representing decision point 2 and so on. I will then ask you to pick one of the folded 
papers. The decision you made on that number will then be paid to you. 
For example, if the paper you selected has the number 2 written on it, then the decision you 
made at decision point 2 will be paid to you. Therefore, if at decision point 2, you chose option 
A, then you keep the ¢10 I gave you before the start of the game. However, if at decision point 
2, you chose Option B, I will ask you to select either head or tail of a coin. I will then toss the 
coin, if you selected head and head comes up or you selected tail and tail comes up, you have 
won an additional ¢10 which will make your total earnings ¢20. However, if you selected head 
and tail comes up or you selected tail and head comes up, then you will lose ¢2 from the ¢10 I 
gave you before the start of the game making your total earnings ¢8. 
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  Decision Table 
Decision OPTION A OPTION B   
1 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢1 A B 
2 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢2 A B 
3 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢3 A B 
4 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢4 A B 
5 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢5 A B 
6 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢6 A B 
7 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢7 A B 
8 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢8 A B 
9 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢9 A B 
10 Keep ¢10 If HH or TT, you win +¢10 If HT or TH, you lose ¢10 A B 
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Appendix H: An Experiment to Elicit Time Preferences of Farmers 
In this game, you will be given a sheet of paper that has a table printed on it. This table 
represents a total of 8 decision points that will be taken by you. You will be asked to indicate 
your preference between 2 options, Option A and Option B. Choosing option A implies that, 
you will prefer rather being given an amount of money an hour after the experiment than wait 
for some specific amount of time to be paid an amount higher than what is paid an hour after 
the experiment. Choosing option B, implies that you will rather wait for some time and receive 
an amount higher than what will be given to you 1 hour after the experiment.  
Note that at every block has 5 decision points, option A has the same amount of money but 
option B has different amount of money with different interest rate. Each block corresponds to 
a decision concerning a particular future time period. Block I correspond to future payments in 
24 hours-time, Block II corresponds to future payment in 1 week, Block III corresponds to 
future pay in 1 month and Block IV corresponds to future payment in 3 months-time. 
So, in each block you have to make 5 decisions comparing the amounts payable in option A 
and option B. You can switch from option A to option B, but you cannot switch from option B 
to option. Thus, if you choose option B in the first decision point in block A, you cannot switch 
to option A at any point in that block. This is because if you prefer being paid ¢5.05 in 1 day 
to being paid ¢5 an hour after the experiment (Decision point 1), then you will definitely prefer 
being paid ¢5.10 in a day to being paid ¢5 an hour after the experiment. 
Example 
1. At decision point 1 of Block I, if you choose option A, then you are saying that you 
will rather be willing to receive ¢5 an hour after the experiment than wait 24 hours to 
be paid ¢5.05. If decision point is selected for payment, then I will pay you ¢5 by mobile 
money an hour after the experiment. However, if you choose option B at decision point 
one in Block I and that point is selected for payment, then I will wait for 24 hours and 
then pay you via mobile money an amount of ¢5.05. 
Note: 
1. You will have to make a choice between option A and B in all the 40 decision points. 
2. You are also to note that once you switch from option A to B in each of the 8 blocks, 
there is no incentive to switch back to option A. Therefore, if you choose option B in 
the first decision point in each of the 8 blocks (decision points 1, 6, 11, 16, 21, 26, 31 
and 36), you cannot switch to A at any point in that block.  
Below is the Decision Table. 
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  Decision Table 
Block Decision Option A Option B   
 
 
I 
1 ¢5 today ¢5.05 in 1 day A B 
2 ¢5 today ¢5.10 in 1 day A B 
3 ¢5 today ¢5.15 in 1 day A B 
4 ¢5 today ¢5.25 in 1 day A B 
5 ¢5 today ¢5.40 in 1 day A B 
 
 
II 
6 ¢5 today ¢5.35 in 1 week A B 
7 ¢5 today ¢5.70 in 1 week A B 
8 ¢5 today ¢6.05 in 1 week A B 
9 ¢5 today ¢6.75 in 1 week A B 
10 ¢5 today ¢7.80 in 1 week A B 
 
 
III 
11 ¢5 today ¢6.50 in 1 month A B 
12 ¢5 today ¢8.00 in 1 month A B 
13 ¢5 today ¢9.50 in 1 month A B 
14 ¢5 today ¢12.50 in 1 month A B 
15 ¢5 today ¢17.00 in 1 month A B 
 
 
IV 
16 ¢5 today ¢9.50 in 3 months A B 
17 ¢5 today ¢14.00 in 3 months A B 
18 ¢5 today ¢18.50 in 3 months A B 
19 ¢5 today ¢27.50 in 3 months A B 
20 ¢5 today ¢41.00 in 3 months A B 
 
 
V 
21 ¢10 today ¢10.10 in 1 day A B 
22 ¢10 today ¢10.20 in 1 day A B 
23 ¢10 today ¢10.30 in 1 day A B 
24 ¢10 today ¢10.50 in 1 day A B 
25 ¢10 today ¢10.80 in 1 day A B 
 
 
VI 
26 ¢10 today ¢10.70 in 1 week A B 
27 ¢10 today ¢11.40 in 1 week A B 
28 ¢10 today ¢12.10 in 1 week A B 
29 ¢10 today ¢13.50 in 1 week A B 
30 ¢10 today ¢15.60 in 1 week A B 
 
 
VII 
31 ¢10 today ¢13.00 in 1 month A B 
32 ¢10 today ¢16.00 in 1 month A B 
33 ¢10 today ¢19.00 in 1 month A B 
34 ¢10 today ¢25.00 in 1 month A B 
35 ¢10 today ¢34.00 in 1 month A B 
 
 
VIII 
36 ¢10 today ¢19.00 in 3 months A B 
37 ¢10 today ¢28.00 in 3 months A B 
38 ¢10 today ¢37.00 in 3 months A B 
39 ¢10 today ¢55.00 in 3 months A B 
40 ¢10 today ¢82.00 in 3 months A B 
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How the participants will be paid: 
At the end of this game, one you would be asked to blindly draw one folded paper out of 40 
numbered and folded papers in a bowl. Each participants’ decision at that decision point would 
be paid for if this game is selected for payment. One of you will select one out of the 40 decision 
points. This is how you will select the number; I will write numbers 1 to 40 on pieces of paper 
and then fold them and put them in a bowl. Each of these numbers represent a decision point, 
with 1 representing decision point 1, 2 representing decision point 2 and so on. I will then ask 
you to pick one of the folded papers. The decision you made on that number will then be paid 
to you. For instance, if the participant pick the number 36 from the box, then I will look at the 
decision you made at decision point 36 and pay you accordingly.  
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Appendix I: Public Good Experiment 
Before the start of this experiment, I will give you an envelope, which contains a total of 10 
toffees. Each toffee in the envelope is worth ¢1 of real money to you. I will then group all of 
you into a group of 4 members in each group. Each participant will then decide individually 
how many toffees to keep for himself and how many to leave in the envelope (which is his 
contribution to the group). Remember each toffee is worth ¢1 so if you keep all 10 toffees you 
have ¢10 for yourself, if you keep 5 toffees, you have ¢5, if you keep 2 toffees, you have ¢1 
for yourself and so on. 
Do not let anyone see the amount you took for yourself and also do not tell anyone about it. 
You are also not allowed to discuss anything with anybody. In other words, nobody in the 
group will have to know how many toffees you took out for yourself and how many toffees are 
left in the envelope. 
The number of toffees in the envelopes, which represents the total contributions by all the 4 
members in the group would be doubled and shared equally among the group members, 
regardless of the amount each participant contributed. In effect, the payoff each and every one 
of you get will be the amount of money you kept for yourself plus the doubled sum of 
money in the box divided by 4, which is the number of individuals in the group.  
For example, if one of you kept 5 toffees for him/herself and the group in total contributed 24 
toffees, then you total payoff will be ¢17 = [(¢5)+{(24*2)/4}] 
In order to observe the strategic behavior of the participants, the game will be played 10 times.  
At the end of the 10th game, one of you will select one out of the 10 games for which I will pay 
you. This is how you will select the number; I will write numbers 1 to 10 on pieces of paper 
and then fold them and put them in a box. I will then ask one of you to pick one of the folded 
papers, the number he will pick will represent the game that you will be paid. For example, the 
number 1 represents the first game, 2 represents the 2nd game and 10 represents the 10th game. 
Therefore, if the number he picked is 5, then it means that all of you will be paid the payoff 
you earned in the 5th game. 
 
